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HOODWINK'D BY CUSTOM: THE EXCLUSION OF WOMEN
FROM JURIES IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH LAW
AND LITERATURE
JUDY M. CORNETT*
[Tihey have nothing to do in constituting Lawes, or consenting
to them, in interpreting of Lawes, or in hearing them
interpreted . .. and yet they stand striatly tyed by mens
establishments, little or nothing excused by ignorance .... 1
[R]ealizations of logical possibility are thwarted in practice, for
women, by the tenacity of structures informed by essentialist
conceptions of 'woman' that deny credibility to their projects. It
is not enough for a woman simply to refuse the essentialism and
act according to her own lights, with the full authority of a
competent knower, in the expectation of public acknowledg-
ment.2
* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A., J.D. University
of Tennessee; M.A., Ph.D. (English) University of Virginia. Earlier versions of this article
were presented at the annual conference of the American Society for Eighteenth-Century
Studies in 1992 and at a faculty forum at the University of Tennessee College of Law in 1994.
I am grateful to the participants in those events for their valuable comments and
suggestions. I am especially grateful to Jerry J. Phillips and Patricia Meyer Spacks, both of
whom read several drafts of the article. Others to whom I owe a debt of gratitude are Dwight
Aarons, Joseph G. Cook, Gabrielle Cowan, Michael H. Hoffheimer, Deseriee Kennedy, Joseph
H. King, Margo Maxwell, Tom Mize, Carol Parker, Barbara Stark, Kathryn Temple, Penny
Tschantz, and John Zomchick.
1. THE LAWES RESOLUTIONS OF WOMENS RIGHTS 2 (Garland Publishing Co. 1978) (1632)
[hereinafter LAWES RESOLUTIONS].
2. LORRAINE CODE, WHAT CAN SHE KNOW? FEMINIST THEORY AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF KNOWLEDGE 187-88 (1991).
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I. INTRODUCTION
A.
Legal scholars have begun to recognize that law is a manifesta-
tion of culture and that, to be talked about comprehensively, law
must be situated within a cultural context. As Richard K. Sherwin
notes, "[A]n adequate understanding of our social practices and
institutions, including legal practices and institutions, cannot be
gained without adequate knowledge of the various underlying
cultural models that create and sustain them."3 In this Article I
hope to compose a partial history of the construction of women as
authoritative actors in the law. I shall limit my focus to eighteenth-
century England, a culture seemingly remote from modern concerns
about women's legal status, but one that is crucial to any historical
understanding of Anglo-American women's exclusion from law-
making and law-interpreting institutions, and one that has not
been fully appreciated by previous legal scholars. I shall examine
a wide range of sources from eighteenth-century law, literature, and
philosophy in which women were represented in relation to legal
and intellectual authority, and I shall interrogate the culture of
eighteenth-century England: "How, given what we believe, must we
act; what, given how we act, must we believe[?]"4
In Part II, I shall establish the legal ground of my analysis by
juxtaposing Blackstone's venerable - and tautological - explana-
tion of women's disqualification from jury service, propter defectum
sexus, with the exception to that disqualification, the jury of
matrons, a special jury impanelled whenever the fact of a woman's
pregnancy was at issue. In Part III, I shall shift my attention to
literature: Charlotte Lennox's 1752 novel, The Female Quixote, in
which the heroine is represented as a powerful but idiosyncratic
and embattled interpreter. In Part IV, I shall address the sources
that most explicitly engage the issue of women's rightful role in the
legal system and other social institutions - the writings of the
early eighteenth-century feminists. These writers, including Mary
Astell and the pseudonymous "Sophia," contentiously confronted the
theological explanation for women's exclusion from legal agency and
exposed the logical rifts upon which it depended.
3. Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview: What We Talk About When
We Talk About Law, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 20 (1992).
4. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 180 (1983).
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From these disparate sources it becomes clear that Woman's
moral, intellectual, and legal authority was debated in terms of the
nature of her Reason. Women's possession of Reason and their
ability to deploy it conventionally were seen as problematic. In
contrast to the overly emotional creatures painted by the nine-
teenth century, women were constructed by the eighteenth-century
sources under discussion as beings less intelligent than men, less
able to convert their perceptions into generalized conclusions. In
short, they were represented as untrustworthy judges.
B.
The theme uniting the two epigraphs, written more than 350
years apart, is the construction of women as authoritative knowers.
Noting that women are bound by laws they do not make, the
(presumably) male author of The Lawes Resolutions declares that
his treatise is directed not to "the deep learned or searchers for
subtility" but to "woman kind."5 He undertakes to educate women
about the laws governing them: "[Mee thinkes it were pitty and
impiety any longer to hold from [women] such Customes, Lawes,
and Statutes . . . principally belonging unto them."6 Thus the
author constructs Woman7 as both insider and outsider - insider
5. LAWES RESOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 3.
6. Id. at 2.
7. Today, '"Woman' is a troublesome term, in feminism and in law." Tracy E. Higgins,
"By Reason of Their Sex" Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1536, 1537 (1995); see also Susan Bordo, Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Scepticism,
in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 133, 135 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990) (noting "a new drift
within feminism, a new scepticism about the use of gender as an analytical category).
However, "Woman" was not a problematic category in early modern England. The writers
discussed here used the terms "men" and "women" to describe unproblematic groups defined,
it seems, by biological attributes. To that extent, the sources discussed here fall prey to the
dangers warned against by modern feminist scholars. See Jane Flax, Postmodernism and
Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 39, 45 (Linda J.
Nicholson ed., 1990) ("To the extent that feminist discourse defines its problematic as
'woman,' it, too, ironically privileges the man as unproblematic or exempted from
determination by gender relations.'); Beth Fowkes Tobin, Introduction: Feminist Historical
Criticism, in HISTORY, GENDER & EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LITERATURE 1, 9 (Beth Fowkes
Tobin ed., 1994) (noting that because feminist scholarship '"tends to isolate women as a
specific and separate topic of history,' it reinscribes patterns of difference and oppression.')
(quoting JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 20 (1985)).
Similarly, issues of race, ethnicity, religion, and class do not surface in any systematic
way in these sources, which are directed to, and assume an audience of, middle- and upper-
class white Protestant Englishwomen. The legal treatises discussed here present an
especially totalizing view of Woman, since they discuss women almost exclusively in terms
of their family relationships and their (often resulting) relationships to property rights.
Obviously, in early modern England there were women of color, women of non-English
ethnicities, non-Protestant women, and non-middle-class women. To the extent that these
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because she is subject to law, outsider because she is excluded from
the processes by which law is made. It is Woman's paradoxical
status vis h vis the law that calls forth the author's effort. Only a
man, an insider to the creation of law, can communicate the law to
the outsiders it governs. Although the author declares that his goal
in writing the treatise is to do "peculiar Service to that Sexe
generally beloved, and by the Author had in venerable estimation, '
the book enacts the power men wield over women by virtue of men's
status as law makers and law interpreters.
According to the author, women's disqualification from making
or interpreting law derives from Eve's role in the Fall. Relying on
the third chapter of Genesis, the author explains "the reason...
that Women have no voyce in Parliament": "Eve because shee had
helped to seduce her husband hath inflicted on her, an especiall
bane. In sorrow shalt thou bring forth thy children, thr desires
shall bee subject to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee."9 The
author argues here that women's legal subordination is divinely
ordained; he asserts that in excluding women from Parliament,
"[tihe common Law here shaketh hand with Divinitie,"' and he
reiterates the status of seventeenth-century women: '"They make
no Lawes, they consent to none, they abrogate none. All of them are
understood either married or to bee married and their desires [are]
subject to their husband.... ."" In this explanatory narrative, then,
Eve's persuasive power over Adam led to divine punishment in the
form of women's subordination to men, which the common law of
England enforces by excluding women from Parliament and from
any position of agency with respect to their own legal status.
The Lawes Resolutions addresses women's status in a specific
arena, the law, during a specific historical period. Because Anglo-
American women are no longer explicitly excluded from lawmaking
institutions, it is tempting to view the paradox taken up by The
Lawes Resolutions as a dead one. Yet the modern philosopher,
Lorraine Code, discerns the same paradox, manifested more subtly
and more pervasively, in modern Anglo-American culture. Al-
though women are no longer overtly excluded from the processes by
which the laws governing them are produced, they are still not fully
accepted as insiders: "In the 1990s women are still largely invisible
women shared cultural identities or legal disabilities that made gender irrelevant or
secondary, the sources take little account of these women.
8. LAWES RESOLUTIONS, supra note 1 (not paginated).





as moral and intellectual authorities ... ,,12 Noting the "close
connections among knowledge, expertise, and authority,"'3 Code
asserts that the belief in "women's alleged lack of deliberative
authority" - originating in Aristotelian thought and enforced by
the Christian creation myth - survives in subtle disparagement of
women's intellect and operates to deprive women, not only of social
recognition of their claimed knowledge, but also of "faith in the
credibility of [their] judgment."'4  Without "public acknowledg-
ment,"'5 Code suggests, women cannot establish even an internal
ground for the exercise of interpretive authority. 6
C.
Theoretically, my project exists at the intersection of cultural
history and New Historicism, both of which draw upon Clifford
Geertz's innovative treatment of all constituents of culture as texts
to be read. For Geertz, culture is an "acted document," and the
relevant question to be asked of all observed phenomena is "what
it is . . . that, in their occurrence and through their agency, is
getting said."' 7  Taking observed phenomena as texts that say
something, then, the interpretation of culture consists of "construct-
ing a reading of what happens,"'8 which in turn requires "sorting
out the structures of signification.., and determining their social
ground and import."'9 Similarly, according to Lynn Hunt, the new
cultural history is concerned with "[s]ymbolic actions":
12. CODE, supra note 2, at 186.
13. Id. at 181.
14. Id. at 186-87.
15. Id. at 188.
16. Code's discussion of women's failure to gain "public acknowledgment" as "competent
knower[s]" is part of her critique of Cartesian epistemology, which arguably posits as
normative a model derived from white male experience, while concomitantly devaluing
women's experience and knowledge. See id. at ix-xii. Code's critique, in turn, is part of an
ongoing project by feminist scholars to explore the potentially gendered underpinnings and
implications of Western science and philosophy. See, e.g., SUSAN BORDO, THE FLIGHT TO
OBJECTIVITY: ESSAYS ON CARTESIANISM AND CULTURE (1987); EVELYN FOX KELLER,
REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE (1985); LONDA SCHIEBINGER, THE MIND HAS NO SEX?:
WOMEN IN THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE (1989). Legal scholars, likewise, have begun to
address the gender assumptions embedded in seemingly neutral rules. See, e.g., Rosemary
C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 127 (1996); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gendering and Engendering Process, 61 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1223 (1993).
17. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 10 (1993).
18. Id. at 18.
19. Id. at 9.
1997]
6 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
In both art history and literary criticism, representation has
long been recognized as the central problem in the discipline:
what does a picture or novel do, and how does it do it? What is
the relation between the picture or novel and the world it
purports to represent? The new cultural history asks the same
kind of questions; first, though, it has to establish the objects of
historical study as being like those of literature and art.20
Thus, the "central task of cultural history" is "[t]he deciphering of
meaning."'"
Literary criticism has also felt the effect of Geertz's view of
cultural analysis. Stephen Greenblatt, generally acknowledged as
the founder of the school of literary criticism known as New Histori-
cism, notes that '"istorians have become increasingly sensitive to
the symbolic dimensions of social practice, while literary critics
have in recent years turned with growing interest to the social and
historical dimensions of symbolic practice."" Consistent with their
belief that "literary and non-literary 'texts' circulate inseparably,"
New Historicists have noticed "bizarre overlappings" among cul-
tural phenomena.2" By examining manifestations of culture, both
literary and non-literary, in light of one another, New Historicism
'disturbs what was previously considered immobile;... fragments
what was thought unified; . . . [and] shows the heterogeneity of
what was imagined consistent with itself."'24
Convinced of the value of studying "law in culture,"2 some legal
commentators have seen New Historicism as a promising methodol-
ogy because it authorizes "reading against every cultural text to
discover the social forces at work sub silento [sic] within it" in an
"attempt[ to elucidate the contingent values of the present by
historicizing and demythologizing the cultural forms of the past."2
20. Lynn Hunt, Introduction: History, Culture, and Text, in THE NEW CULTURAL HISTORY
1, 16-17 (Lynn Hunt ed., 1989).
21. Id. at 12.
22. Stephen Greenblatt, Culture, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR LITERARY STUDY 225, 230
(Frank Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin eds., 1995).
23. H. Aram Veeser, Introduction, in THE NEW HISTORICISM ix, xi (H. Aram Veeser ed.,
1989). An extreme view of what New Historicists do is articulated by John Morrison: "[W]e
can link anything to anything else because everything is history." John Morrison, Doing
Fish: A Review of There's No Such Thing As Free Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 521, 528 (1995)
(reviewing STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH (1994)).
24. Hunt, supra note 20, at 8 (quoting Michel Foucault, quoted in ALLAN MEGILL,
PROPHETS OF EXTREMITY: NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT, DERRIDA 234-35 (1985)).
25. Robert Weisberg, Reading Poethics, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1103, 1123 (1994) (reviewing
RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE (1992)).
26. Francis J. Mootz III, Legal Classics: After Deconstructing the Legal Canon, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 977, 990-91 (1994). Despite scholarly interest in New Historicism, few legal scholars
[Vol. 4:1
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Some of the legal scholars most interested in the promise of New
Historicism are feminists.27 Among literary critics, the relationship
between feminists and New Historicists has been problematic, with
some feminists complaining that New Historicism has not suffi-
ciently attended to gender issues.2" Feminist scholarship, however,
is the source of many of the assumptions and practices of New
Historicism," and feminist scholars see affinities between New
Historicist methods and the practice in women's studies of "cross
cultural montage," in which "(once) untraditional sources, [such as]
women's letters and diaries, women's manuals, women's novels,
even seances were juxtaposed with more traditional and public
texts."3 Like New Historicism, women's studies challenges the
traditional definition of history by focusing, not solely on political
events, but on "representation, role prescription, ideas, values,
psychology and the construction of subjectivity."31  Thus, the
interests of feminists and New Historicists, far from being opposed,
are closely aligned.
D.
It has seldom been appreciated that when Blackstone crystal-
lized his famous rationalization for women's disqualification as
jurors, English culture was openly suspicious of women as reason-
ers. Under the later "separate spheres" theory, women were
suspect reasoners because they were seen as overly emotional
have explicitly aligned their projects with this methodology. But see Peter Jaszi, Toward a
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship, " 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 457 n.5 ("[M~y
efforts to draw out homologous relationships between developments in law and developments
in literary culture - without insisting that one is somehow determined by the other - have
something in common with the techniques of'New Historicism."'). More commonly, scholars
draw upon the techniques and assumptions of New Historicism without feeling obliged to
explicitly acknowledge their allegiance. See, e.g., Kathryn Temple, Johnson and Macpher-
son: Cultural Authority and the Construction of Literary Property, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 355
(1993).
27. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist
Legal Thought, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 303, 326 (noting that feminists may benefit from an idea
of progress derived from "a historical organization relying on multiple narratives, local and
regional histories, plural perspectives, thick descriptions, and irreducible particularities');
Joan Chalmers Williams, Culture and Certainty: Legal History and the Reconstructive
Project, 76 VA. L. REV. 713, 737 (1990) (lauding scholarship exploring multifarious
manifestations of "women's culture" in American history).
28. See Judith Lowder Newton, History as Usual? Feminism and the "New Historicism,"
in THE NEW HISTORICISM, supra note 23, at 152, 155.
29. See id. at 152-53; Jerome J. McGann, Introduction: A Point of Reference, in
HISTORICAL STUDIES AND LITERARY CRITICISM 3, 4 (Jerome J. McGann ed., 1985).
30. Newton, supra note 28, at 154.
31. Id.
1997]
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("emotion" representing the opposite of "reason"); but in the
eighteenth century, English culture debated women's proper role as
authoritative lawmakers and interpreters in terms of their Reason,
not their emotions. By treating the jury of matrons as a "signifying
practice" that can be thickly described and by placing the jury of
matrons within a cultural context in which the nature of Woman
and her concomitant right to exercise authority was debated in both
literary and philosophical terms, we can see clearly what New
Historicist critic Louis Montrose has called
an equivocal process of subjectification: on the one hand,
shaping individuals as loci of consciousness and initiators of
action - endowing them with subjectivity and with the capacity
for agency; and, on the other hand, positioning, motivating, and
constraining them within - subjecting them to - social
networks and cultural codes that ultimately exceed their
comprehension or control.32
Woman's authority, her access to Reason, her very subjectivity -
these myriad associations as they circulated in eighteenth-century
English law, literature, and philosophy, form the topic of this
Article.
II. THE EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM JURIES
A. Generally
Stimulated, perhaps, by the recently decided controversy over
the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory challenges, 33 scho-
lars in recent years have shown a great deal of interest in the exclu-
sion of women from Anglo-American juries. 34 These scholars have
usefully reminded us that jury service has always been considered
"an important element of full citizenship. '35 Because the jury is "an
instrument of self-governance," jury service "enable[s] citizens to
participate in public life. '3 6 These scholars point out that, not
32. Louis A. Montrose, Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics of Culture,
in THE NEW HIsTORIcIsM, supra note 23, at 15, 21.
33. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
34. See Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury
Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139 (1993); Carol Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1986); Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women's Jury Service: Right of
Citizenship or Privilege of Difference?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1994). See generally Carole L.
Hinchcliff, American Women Jurors: A Selected Bibliography, 20 GA. L. REV. 299 (1986).
35. Grossman, supra note 34, at 1122.
36. Id. at 1121.
[Vol. 4:1
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surprisingly, suffragists linked the right to serve on juries with the
right to vote.37 Despite recent scholars' insights, however, their
historical analysis has focused primarily on nineteenth and early
twentieth-century America.3" During this period, as Carol Weisbrod
correctly points out, "[a] central assumption made by both sides in
these debates was that woman's special sphere was the home."39
37. See Babcock, supra note 34, at 1165 ("From the beginning their [suffragists] struggle
was also about the right to serve on juries. The two causes were the twin indicia of full
citizenship both in the minds of woman suffragists and in the attitudes of American
society."); Weisbrod, supra note 34, at 63 ("The early debate over women's jury service was
part of a more general discussion of women's participation in the public sphere which focused
on the issue of women's suffrage."). It should be noted, however, that passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment did not automatically secure women's right to serve on juries. See
Grossman, supra note 34, at 1136-38. Grossman notes the astounding fact that "[n]ot until
1968 could women serve as jurors in all fifty states." Id. at 1138.
38. See Babcock, supra note 34, at 1162-72; Weisbrod, supra note 34, at 63-67; see also
Grossman, supra note 34, at 1133-38.
39. Weisbrod, supra note 34, at 62; see also Babcock, supra note 34, at 1167 ('The
apparent fear was that a public woman would no longer have time for the domestic duties
that were her higher and finer calling. Time spent 'fore the justice seat,' would, moreover,
be a pollutant for women who were supposed to inhabit an ideal world of nurturance and
tenderness.").
When Parliament debated a proposed amendment to the Sex Disqualification (Removal)
Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71 (Eng.) (granting women the right to serve on all juries) that
would have permitted the judge to order that a case be tried by a jury composed entirely of
one sex, the Members' comments reveal all the features noted by Babcock and Weisbrod in
America: the emphasis on jury service as a privilege of citizenship and the linkage between
voting and jury service, see 120 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 388 (remarks of Major Greame)
("After all, women are taking up their position in the State largely as a position of equal
citizenship today. They have accepted that position during the War, and the extension of the
franchise itself is very largely the recognition of the position that women have rights as
citizens."); and the discourse of delicacy and domesticity, see id. at 383 (remarks of Sir E.
Hume-Williams) ("Anyone who has experience of some of the terrible cases that have to be
tried in our Courts, and the almost revolting evidence that, unfortunately, has to be given
- evidence which is almost unfit for any jury to hear - will agree with me that it is
impossible that such cases should be tried before a jury composed of women, or partly of men
and partly of women."); id. at 391 ('Take a case where the sole dispute is as to the price of
clothes or the fit of a dress .... I should think a jury of women would determine it in about
half the time [as a jury of men] .... On the other hand, there might be a case of a purely
commercial dispute involving the commercial customs of London, the interpretation of
charter parties, and all sorts of technical terms which the ordinary woman cannot
understand. It would be equally appropriate... that it should be tried by a jury of men.").
These remarks were countered by comments reflecting a traditionally liberal position, see
id. at 383 (remarks of Major Hills) ("It may be said that women should be kept more apart,
that they should be kept from contact with rough and brutal phases of life. But bear in mind
... the insistent demand of women for equality with men - equality of opportunity, equality
of sacrifice, equality of duty."); and a more radical feminism, see id. at 386-87 (remarks of
Captain Elliot) ("it may not be practicable to have women juries to try certain cases, because
of the conventions which-have grown up by which you may not mention certain things in the
presence of a woman; but I would ask this Committee to consider that it is part of the
Victorian attitude that apparently while you may not say things to women you may do things
to women .... When you have swept away the shame of the streets, and when, if ever, we
forbid women in hospitals to perform the revolting duties which they have to do, then we can
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But, as Londa Schiebinger has persuasively demonstrated, the
"separate spheres" theory for restricting women's civic role came to
be dominant only in the latter half of the eighteenth century.40
Although there were occasional references in eighteenth-century
popular discourse to essentialist conceptions of women's proper
role,41 the dominant rationale for women's exclusion from many
aspects of public life was that they lacked something men had; as
Anne Williams puts it, 'Western culture has generally insisted that
'reason' is not a feminine strength. During the Enlightenment, the
age-old debate about what it was, exactly, that women lacked,
focused on their supposed incapacity for this 'highest' and most
definitive human capacity."42 The relationship between women and
Reason was a central issue in non-legal discourse in eighteenth-
century England, and literary scholars like Williams have long
recognized the implications of this issue for the way women are
represented.43 Although legal scholars have not shown much
interest in the construction of female rationality, this issue adds
enormous explanatory power to the legal strictures on women's
public role, especially their exclusion from jury service.44
come with clean hands and say, 'We do not want you to listen to certain rather unpleasant
phrases';... Let us remember that hundreds of thousands of women are suffering in their
bodies things which we think we are doing something to remove by protecting their ears.").
The amendment was adopted. Section 1(b) of the Act provided:
[A]ny judge. . . may, in his discretion, on an application made by or on behalf
of the parties... or at his own instance, make an order that the jury shall be
composed of men only or of women only as the case may require, or may, on an
application made by a woman to be exempted from service on a jury in respect
of any case by reason of the nature of the evidence to be given or of the issues
to be tried, grant such exemption.
Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § 1(b) (Eng.).
40. See SCHIEBINGER, supra note 16, at 216; see also DAVID H. RICHTER, THE PROGRESS
OF ROMANCE: LITERARY HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE GOTHIC NOVEL 64 (1996) (noting that the
conceptual split between public and private spheres that underlay the cult of domesticity was
not firmly established until 1820-1850).
41. An example is Richard Steele's famous declaration:
I do not mean it an Injury to Women, when I say there is a Sort of Sex in Souls.
I am tender of offending them, and know it is hard not to do it on this Subject;
but I must go on to say, That the Soul of a Man and that of a Woman are made
very unlike, according to the Employments for which they are designed. The
Ladies will please to observe, I say, our Minds have different, not superior
Qualities to theirs.
RICHARD STEELE, THE TATLER NO. 172, May 16, 1710, reprinted in 2 THE TATLER 443, 444
(Donald F. Bond ed., 1987) (footnote omitted).
42. ANNE WILLIAMS, ART OF DARKNESS: A POETICS OF GOTHIC 170 (1995).
43. See, e.g., FELICITY A. NUSSBAUM, THE BRINK OF ALL WE HATE: ENGLISH SATIRES ON
WOMEN 1660-1750 (1984).
44. It should be noted at the outset that the number of women who were, as a practical
matter, excluded from jury service solely because of their sex was probably very small. The
property qualification for jury service in 1692 stood at £10 in freehold estate. 4 W. & M., ch.
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-1 In eighteenth-century England, as Janelle Greenberg notes,
single women "enjoyed, for the most part, the same rights and
responsibilities as did men" in the private sphere.4" They could own
property, make contracts, and sue and be sued in their own
names.6 However, "in public law, there was no place for [women],
except on the throne. 47 In addition to being disqualified from jury
service, women could not vote and could not serve in Parliament.4"
In early modern England, jury service was a much more
political act than is jury service in modern-day America. The
medieval jury, from which the early modern jury developed, was an
integral part of local government and functioned very differently
from the modern Anglo-American trial jury. Rather than being
limited to factfinding and law application in a discrete legal
controversy, the medieval jury functioned as an investigative or
administrative body. Writing of royal jurors, one scholar notes:
By 1450, juries had become the political eyes and ears of the
countryside. There was little to do with local affairs that the
jury could not touch. In juries, the crown routinely met the
country to assess and collect taxes, to clear roads, scour ditches,
claim escheats, convict criminals, and protect property; through
them, kings labored to maintain at strength the armed forces of
the realm and even its ale .... In a provincial governance that
increasingly took the form of government-by-jury, juries had an
integral and essential political role to play.49
24 (1692) (Eng.), renewed and extended by 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25 (1730) (Eng.). Freeholders of both
sexes represented only a minority of the population of early modern England; "[m]ost people
held land in copyhold or, increasingly, leasehold." AMY LOUISE ERICKSON, WOMEN AND
PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 40 (1993). Moreover, the combination of intestate
succession laws that preferred males to females and the tendency of testators to devise land
to male descendants while bequeathing moveables to female descendants meant that women
were less likely than men to inherit freehold estates. See id. at 61-78. Even women of the
wealthier classes would presumably have been excluded by the doctrine of coverture unless
their separate estates were sufficient to meet the property qualification. In practical terms,
therefore, the gender-based exclusion from jury service operated only against upper-class
single women (including widows) and upper-class married women having substantial
separate estates.
45. Janelle Greenberg, The Legal Status of the English Woman in Early Eighteenth-





49. R.B. Goheen, Peasant Politics? Village Community and the Crown in Fifteenth-
Century England, 96 AM. HIST. REV. 42, 43 (1991) (footnote omitted).
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As Sherri Olson has shown, service as juror of a local court tended
to correlate highly with service in other local political offices: "the
men most frequently called on to fill the important posts of reeve,
beadle, bailiff, affeeror, constable, ale taster, collector of court fines,
and hayward were men who either had or would serve as juror."5 °
Concomitantly, local jurors were frequently chosen from families
having a long tradition of jury service because "[s]uch individuals
were more likely to possess the means to stay abreast of local
events and benefit from the vast compass of intra- and extrafamilial
relationships .... ."" Even though the jury had evolved by the
eighteenth century into the factfinding body that rendered a verdict
in a particular case, the jury continued to play a political role in
certain cases, like the Penn-Mead case, 2 in which the Crown was
persecuting its political enemies. In the latter half of the seven-
teenth century and into the eighteenth century, there was substan-
tial pamphlet literature advocating that grand and petit juries use
their power to repel the oppressive use of prosecutorial power.53
50. Sherri Olson, Jurors of the Village Court: Local Leadership Before and After the
Plague in Ellington, Huntingdonshire, 30 J. BRIT. STUD. 237, 245 (1991).
51. Id. at 242; accord Goheen, supra note 49, at 53 (noting that "[g]entry families... used
generations of jury service to help define their claims to provincial political status.').
52. 6 State Trials 951 (1670). The Penn/Mead trial became important to the history of
the jury when the Court imprisoned the recalcitrant jurors in that trial for failing to return
a verdict of "guilty." One of the imprisoned jurors, Bushell, brought a habeas action in which
Chief Justice Vaughn ruled that jurors could not be fined for returning a verdict in
accordance with their consciences. Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). See
generally THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, at 200-21 (1985); John A. Phillips & Thomas
C. Thompson, Jurors v. Judges in Later Stuart England: The Penn/Mead Trial and
Bushell's Case, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 189 (1986).
53. In an anonymous work, THE ENGLISH-MANs RIGHT. A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A
BARRISTER AT LAW AND A JURY-MAN (London 1680), a man summoned to jury duty, clearly
thinking of the imprisonment of the jurors who failed to convict William Penn, expresses his
desire to be excused on the ground that "there sometimes happen nice cases, wherein it may
be difficult to discharge ones conscience without incurring the displeasure of the Court, and
thence trouble and damage may arise." Id. at 1. The barrister enters into a long disquisition
on the history and powers of the jury and addresses the prospective juror's fears as follows:
"But however will any man that fears God, nay that is but an honest Heathen debauch his
Conscience, and forswear himself, do his Neighbour Injustice, betray his Countreys [sic]
Liberties, and consequently enslave himself and his Posterity, and all this meerly because
he is Hector'd and threaten'd a little?" Id. at 23. In a 1681 treatise, Lord Somers decries the
recent laxity of grand jurors, noting,
It is a wonder that they were not more awakened with the attempt of the late
lord chief justice Keyling, who would have usurped a lordly, dictatorian power
over the grand jury of Somersetshire, and commanded them to find a bill of
indictment for murder, for which they saw no evidence, and upon their refusal,
he not only threatened the jury, but assumed to himself an arbitrary power to
fine them.
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The political nature of the jury helps explain why women could
appear in court as litigants (at least, single women could litigate in
their own names) and as witnesses, but not as judge, attorney, or
juror. All three roles were viewed as public, i.e., political offices.
Not only were eighteenth-century Englishwomen barred from
holding public office, but they were also subject to ridicule for
taking any role in politics. The vicious lampooning of the Duchess
of Devonshire's campaign activities in support of Charles James Fox
in the 1784 Parliamentary elections demonstrates that not even
JOHN LORD SOMERS, THE SECURITY OF ENGLISHMEN'S LIVES: OR, THE TRUST, POWER AND
DUTY OF GRAND JURIES OF ENGLAND 17 (London 1766) (1681). With respect to Keyling's
action, Somers comments, "Here was a bold battery made upon the antient fence of our
reputations, and lives: if that justice's will had passed for law, all the gentlemen of the grand
juries must have been the basest vassals to the judges ...... Id. Another author, also said
to be Lord Somers, see LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY
90 n.14 (1973), recounts the events surrounding Bushell's Case, and then opines, "But
however, a Jury in any Indictment, Presentment, or Information, ought, and may give their
Verdict, &c. according to their own Conscience, without any fear of Punishment one way or
other." A PERSON OF QUALITY, A GUIDE TO ENGLISH JURIES 40-41 (London 1682).
The contest between judge and jury for political power in the eighteenth century was
waged most acutely in the seditious libel cases. See generally 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE
MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
775-808 (1992). The debate about the respective powers of judge and jury in determining
whether publication of particular views should be criminal was generalized as a debate over
the jury's right to determine questions of law as well as questions of fact. For example, in
a 1764 treatise, Joseph Towers refutes the royal courts' view of the jury's power in libel cases,
which he summarizes as follows:
[I]f any man is charged.., with writing, printing, or publishing, any book,
pamphlet, or paper, which is in such information or indictment stiled a libel, it
is not the business of the jury to enquire, whether such book, pamphlet, or
paper, really be a libel, or not; but only into the simple matter of fact, whether
the person so charged be the author, printer, or publisher of such book,
pamphlet, or paper; and to leave the,., determination whether it be a libel or
not, entirely to the Court.
JOSEPH TOWERS, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE QUESTION, WHETHER JURIES ARE, OR ARE NOT,
JUDGES OF LAW, AS WELL AS OF FACT 10 (Garland Publishing Co. 1978) (1764). Towers offers
the following comment on this relegation of the jury to deciding only factual issues: "But if
this principle be once admitted,... that for the people of England then to pretend to be in
possession of a freedom of the press, would be ridiculous. They would then have no liberty
of the Press, but what the judges of the court of King's Bench might think proper to grant
them .... Id. Finally, in 1792, Earl Stanhope comments upon the theory that juries could
decide only the facts, and not the law, in libel cases:
It will scarcely be believed by Posterity, that at the End of the Eighteenth
Century, a System should have been attempted to be established, that Juries
should be directed to find a Man Guilty of a Crime, for publishing a Paper which
contains no criminal Matter whatsoever; and that the Question of the
Criminality or Innocence of the Person thus blindly convicted by the Jury,
should afterwards be decided by Judges appointed by the Crown: which System,
if it had been established, would have annihilated at one Blow the Liberty of
England.
CHARLES EARL STANHOPE, THE RIGHTS OF JURIES DEFENDED 4 (London 1792).
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wealth or social class could overcome the prejudice against women
in public roles.54 In 1778 even the spectator gallery of Parliament
was closed to women.55 Not only could women not participate in
lawmaking as authoritative actors, but they were prohibited even
from observing the legislative process.
As Pollock and Maitland note, "No text-writer, no statute, ever
makes any general statement as to the position of women. This is
treated as obvious ... ."56 More precisely, women's legal subordina-
tion and their concomitant exclusion from the public sphere were
not theorized. Beginning in 1632 with The Lawes Resolutions of
Womens Rights5 7 and continuing throughout our period with Baron
and Feme (1700)," A Treatise of Feme Coverts: Or, the Lady's Law
(1732)," 9 and The Laws Respecting Women (1777),60 treatise writers
focused on the legal rights of women. With the exception of the
rights of "Queen Consorts" and "Queen Dowagers,"'" however, these
treatises do not treat women as citizens. Instead, they focus almost
exclusively on women's rights in various family relationships (as
wife, daughter, mother) and, relatedly, their rights in relation to
property (as ward, wife, widow)." Even Locke's magisterial Second
Treatise of Government failed to "considero the anomalous political
status of single adult women."63 When Mary Astell broke this
silence by writing of the civil, legal, and political rights of women,
her "construction of herself as a free British citizen, subject to no
one but her monarch, was a radical reconception of women's place
in the polity.
64
Although some legal writers explicitly mention women's
restricted rights, they do not offer any explanatory narrative. For
example, in his lectures at Oxford in 1767-1773, Sir Robert
Chambers, discussing the qualifications of ambassadors, notes:
54. See LINDA COLLEY, BRITONS: FORGING THE NATION 1707-1837, at 242-48 (1992).
55. See id. at 248-49.
56. 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 482 (2d ed. 1898).
57. LAWES RESOLUTIONS, supra note 1.
58. BARON AND FEME. A TREATISE OF THE COMMON LAW. CONCERNING HUSBANDS AND
WIVES. (Garland Publishing Co. 1978) (1700).
59. A TREATISE OF FEME COVERTS: OR, THE LADY'S LAW (Garland Publishing Co. 1978)
(1732).
60. THE LAWS RESPECTING WOMEN (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1974) (1777).
61. Id. at 2-3.
62. See, e.g., id. at 66-70, 107-292.
63. Ruth Perry, Mary Aatell and the Feminist Critique of Possessive Individualism, 23




strange doctrines... which some authors have maintained, as,
for instance, that neither persons under the age of twenty-five
years nor women can be employed in embassies, whereas daily
experience contradicts the former part of the rule, and with
regard to the latter, instances may be found in which the
general impropriety of conferring such offices on women has
been overbalanced by particular reasons .... 65
Chambers clearly expects his audience to comprehend and appreci-
ate the "general impropriety" of appointing women to "offices" such
as ambassador. It is this "general impropriety" that kept women
out of the jury box, and it is this "general impropriety," the don~e
of the preceding passage, that is of especial interest. What was the
foundation of this general impropriety? What did the eighteenth
century believe about women that made it possible to assert this
general impropriety as a given?
With respect to women's exclusion from juries, Blackstone's
explanation is most frequently quoted. After noting the overriding
requirement that a juror be "liber et legalis homo,"6 Blackstone
went on to explain, "Under the word homo also, though a name
common to both sexes, the female is however excluded, propter
defectum sexus [on account of a defect of sex] . ... "67 This explana-
tion is, of course, a tautology: women are excluded from jury service
because they are women and not men. But by noting the
disjunction between the linguistic inclusion and the practical
exclusion of women from the jury, Blackstone seems to display some
discomfort and some sense of incongruity.
In addition to women, Blackstone discusses two other classes
of persons disqualified from jury service: aliens, who suffer from a
"defect of birth,"6 and bondsmen or slaves, who suffer from a
65. 1 SIR ROBERT CHAMBERS, A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE ENGLISH LAW 1767-1773,
at 264 (Thomas M. Curley ed., 1986). Chambers was assisted by Samuel Johnson in
composing his lectures. Thomas M. Curley, Preface to 1 SIR ROBERT CHAMBERS, A COURSE
OF LECTURES ON THE ENGLISH LAW 1767-1773, at xi.
66. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *362 (University
of Chicago Press 1979) (1765-69). The inclusion of the term "liber" in this descriptive phrase
was the subject of controversy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. For a history of this
controversy, see Goheen, supra note 49, at 56-60.
67. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *362. The very fact that Blackstone offers an
explanation for women's exclusion from jury service may indicate that there was growing
pressure to justify the exclusion. Only thirty years earlier, in his 1736 treatise, The Pleas
of the Crown, Sir Matthew Hale did not even mention the exclusion of women from juries,
much less seek to explain it. See 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN *154-56, *264-65 (1736). I am indebted to Michael H. Hoifheimer for this
observation.
68. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *362.
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"defect of liberty."69 We might hope that the three categories of
persons disqualified from jury service would share common
characteristics that would help explain why women were excluded.
Unfortunately, that does not appear to be the case. By Blackstone's
time, the exclusion of "bondsmen" from juries was practically a dead
letter. The class of persons disqualified from jury service because
of the "defect of liberty" are probably best understood as "serfs" or
"villeins," who later became tenants by copyhold.7° Because
villeinage was abolished in 1660, and because copyholders were
allowed to serve on juries in the royal courts beginning in 1692,1
the exclusion of "slaves" and "bondsmen" from juries could not have
operated very frequently in the eighteenth century.
The exclusion of women from juries is more analogous to the
exclusion of aliens, 2 who could serve, from Norman times by
custom and from the fourteenth century by statute,73 on a special
jury - composed one-half of "denizens" and one-half of aliens -
whenever one of the litigants was an alien.7 '4 Flourishing in the
local mercantile courts known as "staple courts," this mixed jury
was originally intended to facilitate the application of mercantile
custom as law in disputes between English and foreign merchants.75
By the mid-seventeenth century, however, aliens on the jury de
medietate linguae were not required to come from the alien
litigant's country or know anything of the controversy. As Giles
Duncombe puts it, "[Ilt matters not, whether the Moiety of Aliens
be of the same Country as the Alien, Party to the Action, is ....
Aliens of any Tongue may serve .... Medietas Linguae is as much
as to say, half English, and half of another Tongue or Country
69. Id.
70. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 375, 421. For a discussion of villein
tenure, see generally CHARLES MONTGOMERY GRAY, COPYHOLD, EQUITY, AND THE COMMON
LAW (1963).
71. See 4 & 5 W. & M., ch. 24, § 15 (1692) (Eng.).
72. As Marianne Constable makes clear, the definition of "alien" for jury exclusion
purposes was fluid over the centuries between the Norman Conquest and the eighteenth
century. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE 9-25 (1994) (discussing the
operations of the staple court and the mixed jury).
73. Statute of the Staple, 1353, 27 Edw. 3, ch. 8 (Eng.); 1354, 28 Edw. 3, ch. 13, § 2 (Eng.);
see also CONSTABLE, supra note 72, at 96-100.
74. See CONSTABLE, supra note 72, at 96-98. By the sixteenth century, the mixed jury
of aliens and denizens had come to be known as the jury de medietate linguae, or the jury "of
the half tongue." Id. at 112-13; see James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 137, 167 (1983).
75. See CONSTABLE, supra note 72, at 96-102.
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whatsoever.""6 According to Constable, the Babelian quality of the
mixed jury by the time of Blackstone signalled the demise of the
"community basis for the mixed jury" and "left the institution bereft
of meaning."" However, both Blackstone and Duncombe suggest a
continuing rationale for the mixed jury: to counteract nationalistic
bias on the part of the jurors who were denizens. As Blackstone
explains:
[W]here either party is an alien born, the jury shall be one half
aliens and the other denizens ... for the more impartial trial.
... But where both parties are aliens, no partiality is to be
presumed to one more than another; and therefore .... the
whole jury are then directed to be denizens.78
Or, as Duncombe puts it, "though the English may be supposed to
favour themselves more than Strangers, yet when both Parties are
Aliens, it will be presumed they favour both alike, and so [are]
indifferent."79  From its origins in Norman times to its final
abolition in 1870, ° the rationale for the mixed jury changed from
expertise (substantive knowledge of mercantile custom)8' to interest
(presumed partiality of aliens for other aliens).
B. The Jury of Matrons
Like aliens, women could serve on a special jury, the "jury of
matrons," a jury of twelve "matrons" or "discreet women."82 Unlike
the jury de medietate linguae, which could be impanelled to try any
factual issue whenever one of the litigants was an alien, the jury of
matrons was available on only one issue: a woman's pregnancy. In
use since the time of Bracton,8" the jury of matrons appears only
infrequently in the reported cases from the sixteenth through the
eighteenth centuries. The jury could be impanelled in two situa-
tions. First, when a female prisoner sentenced to death, like Moll
76. GILES DUNCOMBE, TRIALS PER PAIS. OR, THE LAW OF ENGLAND CONCERNING JURIES
BY Nisi PRIUS, & C. 195 (William S. Hein & Co. 1980) (1725).
77. CONSTABLE, supra note 72, at 126.
78. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *360.
79. DUNCOMBE, supra note 76, at 195.
80. See Naturalization Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 14, § 5 (Eng.); Deborah A. Ramirez,
The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De Medietate Linguae: A History
and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 786-87 (1994).
81. See CONSTABLE, supra note 72, at 96-102.
82. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *395.
83. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 484.
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Flanders' mother, "pleaded her Belly"84 in order to postpone the
execution, the judge would direct the jury of matrons to determine
whether she was "quick with child (for barely, with child, unless it
be alive in the womb, is not sufficient)."85 Second, in the case of a
"suppositious heir," when a widow claimed to be pregnant with a
child who would inherit from her deceased husband, the remaining
heirs could sue out the writ de ventre inspiciendo directing the
sheriff to impanel a jury of matrons to determine whether the
widow was indeed pregnant.86
Scholars examining women's jury service frequently mention
the jury of matrons as an exception to women's exclusion from the
jury.87 But no legal scholar has thoroughly analyzed the signifi-
cance of the exception. If we believe that "the exception proves the
rule," or in other words, that we can learn something about the rule
by studying its exceptions, then we should be able to learn some-
thing about the rationale for women's disqualification from jury
service in general by studying the one situation in which women
were allowed to serve as jurors.
What qualified a woman to serve on the jury of matrons?
Commentators have suggested that the "matrons" of the jury were
midwives" or "married women or widows who had experience with
childbirth."89 The distinction between a "midwife" and a married
woman or widow having "experience with childbirth" would not
have been a sharp one. Although midwives in England were
licensed by the Bishop until the licensing system began breaking
down in the 1720s,9 °  licensure did not guarantee skill: "the
84. DANIEL DEFOE, MOLL FLANDERS 8 (Edward Kelly ed., Norton Critical ed. 1973) (1722).
Modern American law retains the prohibition on execution of a pregnant woman: "A sentence
of death shall not be carried out upon a woman while she is pregnant." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3596(b)
(West Supp. 1997). I am indebted to Dwight Aarons for this reference.
85. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *395.
86. See Ex parte Aiscough, 24 Eng. Rep. 873 (Ch. 1730); Oldham, supra note 74, at 171-
72. In addition to these two reported uses of the jury of matrons, an all-female jury was used
in Princess Ann County, Virginia in 1696 to search Grace Sherwood, a woman accused of
witchcraft, for "witch marks." The sheriff was ordered to "request as many antient and
knowing women as possible [sic] he can to search carefully for all marks or spots about her
body not usual on others, etc." WINFIELD S. NEVINS, THE WITCHES OF SALEM 45 n. (1994).
I am indebted to Tom Mize for this reference.
87. See Weisbrod, supra note 34, at 59-60 n.2; Grossman, supra note 34, at 1133 n.102.
88. See Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias
and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1205 (1992).
89. Oldham, supra note 74, at 172.
90. See JEAN DONNISON, MIDWIVES AND MEDICAL MEN: A HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR
THE CONTROL OF CHILDBIRTH 35 (2d ed. 1988). In a short section entitled "Of Midwives," the
author of The Laws Respecting Women (1777) states: "In order for a midwife to obtain a
licence, she must be recommended under the hands of matrons who have experienced her
Skill, and also of the parish minister certifying as to her life and conversation, and that she
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Bishops [were] concerned more with the orthodoxy of the midwife
than with her professional skill."'" In difficult births, the midwife
was frequently called upon to baptize the infant's head before its
delivery. The Protestant dread of an infant's being baptized into
the Roman Catholic Church by an unscrupulous midwife led to the
church's assertion of authority over the profession.92 According to
Mrs. Cellier, who petitioned James II in 1688 to grant a royal
charter for a corporation of midwives, during the mid-sixteenth
century the licensing process included an examination "before six
skilful Midwives, and as many Chirurgions expert in the Art of
Midwifery."93 Cellier asserted, however, that this practice ended
when licensing duties were transferred to the Doctors Commons.94
The prosecution of unlicensed midwives, therefore, was based on
the desire for orthodoxy rather than any concern for ensuring a
minimum level of skill.95
Certainly, since no formal education in midwifery was avail-
able, apprenticeship offered the best opportunity for gaining the
necessary skills and knowledge.9" However, even apprenticeship
was not required of midwives. In the words of Raynold, a sixteenth-
century commentator, some midwives' training consisted solely of
"haunting women in their labours."97 Raynold apparently refers
here to the custom of summoning all the neighborhood women to
witness a birth. These "Gossips, 98 who observed the midwife at
work and who might be called upon to assist in emergencies, may
well have practiced midwifery with or without the benefit of an
apprenticeship or a license.
Until the eighteenth century, midwifery was the only non-
domestic profession dominated by women. Women who practiced
midwifery, "whether skilled or unskilled, regarded it as the chief
business of their lives, and depended upon it for their mainte-
nance."99 Although the "man-midwife" had appeared in England in
the early 1600s, he usually was employed only in emergencies.' 0
is a member of the church of England." THE LAWS RESPECTING WOMEN, supra note 60, at 10-
1l.
91. ALICE CLARK, WORKING LIFE OF WOMEN IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 276 (1919).
92. See id. at 277-78.
93. Id. at 276.
94. See id. at 276.
95. See id. at 278-79.
96. See id. at 269.
97. Id.
98. ROBERT A. ERICKSON, MOTHER MIDNIGHT: BIRTH, SEX, AND FATE IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY FICTION (DEFOE, RICHARDSON, AND STERNE) 11 (1986).
99. CLARK, supra note 91, at 265.
100. See DONNISON, supra note 90, at 33.
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Gradually, however, men had begun to challenge the ascendancy of
the female midwife, primarily by denying women opportunities for
education in the sciences.1 ' After the introduction of the forceps
around 1720, the female midwife rapidly lost ground; custom
prohibited female midwives from using instruments, and the useful-
ness of the forceps in difficult births guaranteed increasing
popularity for the man-midwife.' °2 The exclusion of females from
scientific education and the growing prestige of the "man-midwife"
led to a flurry of treatises on midwifery, authored by both female
midwives and male physicians, beginning in the late seventeenth
century and continuing throughout the eighteenth.' 3 This period
also witnessed agitation for better education and training for
midwives. Proposals were usually based upon the French system
of teaching hospitals, and in fact, several 'lying-in" hospitals were
established in England in the eighteenth century.
10 4
In several of the midwives' manuals, midwives are equated
with matrons. In his 1637 work, Expert Midwife or An Excellent
and most necessary Treatise of the generation and birth of Man,
Jacob Rueff entitled his preface 'To all grave and modest
Matrons."'0 5 Nicholas Culpeper, in his Directory for Midwives, ad-
dresses his readers as follows: "Worthy Matrons, You are of the
number of those whom my soul loveth ... ."106 Despite this
apparent equation of midwives and matrons, however, other
evidence suggests that the two were not synonymous. In his
treatise The Speculum Matricis, James Wolveridge notes that the
audience for his book will include "not only... Learned Scholars,
but [also] Grave Matrons, and Expert Midwives."107 Similarly,
suggesting that not all members of the jury of matrons were
101. See CLARK, supra note 91, at 269-73.
102. See DONNISON, supra note 90, at 34. Of course, the unskilled or indiscriminate use
of the forceps was condemned. Tristram Shandy's nose is the most enduring example of the
mishaps that could attend the use of forceps. LAWRENCE STERNE, THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF
TRISTRAM SHANDY, GENTLEMAN (The Odyssey Press 1940) (1760-67). See generally
DONNISON, supra note 90, at 41-46.
103. See DONNISON, supra note 90, at 45; Robert A. Erickson, 'The Books of Generation"
Some Observations on the Style of the British Midwife Books, 1671-1764, in SEXUALITY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 74-94 (Paul-Gabriel Bouc6 ed., 1982).
104. See DONNISON, supra note 90, at 37-38.
105. Erickson, supra note 103, at 90 n.2 (quoting JACOB RUEFF, EXPERT MIDWIFE OR AN
EXCELLENT AND MOST NECESSARY TREATISE OF THE GENERATION AND BIRTH OF MAN (London,
1637)).
106. CLARK, supra note 91, at 271-72 (quoting NICHOLAS CULPEPER, DIRECTORY FOR
MIDWIVES (1651)).




midwives, Giles Jacob notes a case involving a "Jury of Women,
whereof two were Midwives." '
The legal sources suggest that all women were viewed as
having knowledge and experience in childbirth. In Ex parte
Aiscough,10 9 counsel for the widow argued against a "jury of
matrons," and the Chancellor postponed the appointment of a 'jury
of matrons" until Michaelmas term, but in the meantime allowed
the heirs to "send two women at seasonable times, to see whether
she is with child."'10 A similar use of "women" is found in Giles
Jacob's law dictionary, where he declares that the writ de ventre
inspiciendo is tried "by a jury of Women.""' This suggestion that all
women are knowledgeable about childbirth may well reflect a
conception of women that, in Jean Donnison's view, gradually died
out under the influence of rationalist philosophy: the view that the
human body "derived its fertility and creative power from arcane
interactions of natural forces, benign or otherwise, of which women
had been credited with special knowledge.""' 2 It may also reflect
the more mundane image of the neighborhood "Gossips" gathered
around the childbed.
There is some evidence, therefore, to support both the proposi-
tion that only midwives were "matrons" eligible for service on the
jury and the proposition that all women were deemed to have
knowledge sufficient to judge the issue of pregnancy. The better
view seems to be, however, that not all women were considered
"matrons" and that not all eligible "matrons" were midwives in the
strict sense. The term "matron" seems to have been used in a
normative sense that included only the most skilled and morally
upright midwives, along with married women and widows who,
though not midwives, were "honest," "discreet," and "grave." Black-
stone used the term "discreet women" as a synonym for
"matrons.""' 3 The midwife's license recited that the license was
granted after "due Examination of divers honest & discreet
women.""' 4 The license also enjoined the midwife that
you shall not make, or assign any Deputy, or Deputies to
exercise under you, or in your absence the office or Room of a
108. 6 GILES JACOB, THE LAW DICTIONARY 334 (Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1811).
109. 24 Eng. Rep. 873 (Ch. 1730).
110. Id. at 874.
111. 6 JACOB, supra note 108, at 333 (emphasis added).
112. DONNISON, supra note 90, at 32.
113. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *395.
114. DONNISON, supra note 90, at 236; see also CLARK, supra note 91, at 277 (describing
a midwife's license).
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Midwife, but only such as yu. shall perfectly know to be right
honest & discreet women, and also apt and able having suffi-
cient knowledge & experience to use & exercise the said place,
function, and office." 5
Johnson defines "discreet" as "[p]rudent; circumspect; cautious;
sober; not rash; not precipitant; not careless; not hardily adventur-
ous," and as "[m]odest; not forward.""' Clarissa Harlowe paints the
character of the "discreet matron" in contrast to that of the "vain
and conceited" woman: "[T]he discreet matron, who carries up (we
will not, in such a one's case, say down) into advanced life, the ever-
amiable character of virtuous prudence, and useful experience,
finds solid veneration take place of airy admiration, and more than
supply the want of it.""'
These definitions remind us that midwives were often depicted
as drunken and ignorant or, worse, as bawds."' In an effort to
battle this popular stereotype of the midwife, many of the treatises
on midwifery delineated the charactei of the ideal midwife. For
example, in his 1671 treatise The Speculum Matricis, James
Wolveridge described "what kind of person a Midwife ought to be":
The best Midwife is she that is ingenuous, that knoweth
Letters, and having a good memory, is studious, neat and
cleanly over the whole body, healthful, strong, and laborious,
and well instructed in women's conditions ... pleasant, quiet,
prudent . . like the Hebrew Midwives, such as fear
God... that the people may multiply and increase after their
hands ....
Similarly, in The Female Physician, containing all the Diseases
incident to that Sex... To which is added, The Whole Art of New
Improv'd Midwifery, John Maubray opined that the midwife
ought to be a Woman of a good middle Age, or solid Parts, of full
Experience, of a healthy, strong, vigorous Body, with clever
small hands... She ought to be Grave and Considerate, endued
115. DONNISON, supra note 90, at 237.
116. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Times Books 1983)
(1755) (page numbers unavailable).
117. SAMUEL RICHARDSON, CLARISSA OR THE HISTORY OF A YOUNG LADY 186 (Angus Ross
ed., Viking Penguin 1985) (1747-48).
118. See DONNISON, supra note 90, at 44-45; Erickson, supra note 103, at 85. See generally
ERICKSON, supra note 98 (examining the portrayal of the midwife in the eighteenth-century
novel).
119. Erickson, supra note 103, at 78.
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with Resolution and Presence of Mind, in order to foresee and
prevent ACCIDENTS; Sagacious and Prudent in difficult
Cases .... 120
Consonant with this desideratum of gravity and prudence,
England followed the European tradition which "required that
[midwives] should be married women of mature age, who had borne
children."'21 The midwife training hospitals, or "lying-in" hospitals,
established during the eighteenth century were directed by Boards
of Governors, but "[t]he day-to-day running of the hospital, and
responsibility for normal deliveries lay with the Matron - always
a widow.' 22 The hospitals accepted as midwife trainees only mar-
ried women or widows who were at least twenty-five years of age
and of good character. 123  Earlier, Mrs. Cellier's Scheme for the
foundation of a Royal Hospital had provided that only the midwife
trainees of the "first rank" be eligible for the position of 'Matron, or
assistant to the Govenment [sic]" of the hospital.'24 Likewise, the
twelve parish hospitals which Cellier envisioned were to be
administered by "twelve Matrons, Assistants to the Corporation of
the Midwives. 1 25 Thus, the term "Matron" seems to have connoted
a woman of superior skill and character, mature both in years and
in experience gained through marriage. It is unlikely, therefore,
that service on the jury of matrons would have been limited to those
officially licensed as midwives.
Most prominently excluded from the jury of matrons was the
woman who had never been married.'26 Although the femme sole
had legal rights superior to those of the married woman in almost
all other respects, the jury of matrons afforded married women a
superior opportunity to participate in the legal system. Marriage
as a qualification for jury service for women leads us to the question
of why the law allowed women to render a verdict solely on the
issue of pregnancy when only male jurors were allowed to judge all
other issues affectihg women.
In James Oldham's view, "courts used the all-female jury for
reasons of delicacy, but they primarily viewed the women as experts
120. Erickson, supra note 103, at 85 (quoting JOHN MAUBRAY, THE FEMALE PHYSICIAN 173
(London, 1724)).
121. DONNISON, supra note 90, at 30; see ERICKSON, supra note 98, at 6-7.
122. DONNISON, supra note 90, at 38.
123. See id. at 39.
124. See CLARK, supra note 91, at 273 n.2.
125. Id.
126. Because a widow was a femme sole, this class of femme sole was eligible for service
on the jury of matrons.
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on the subject of their inquiry." '127 The motive of delicacy finds
support in the controversy surrounding the introduction of man-
midwives. The midwife's license commanded the midwife: "[Ylou
shall be secret, and not open any matter appertaining to yr. office,
in ye presence of any man, unless necessity, or very urgent occasion
do constrain you so to doe."' 28 Donnison notes that "many women
had strong objections to male attendance ... and were, it is said,
prepared to die rather than admit a man to the lying-in room." '129
Even when a man-midwife was called upon, "out of deference to the
woman's modesty, [he] commonly worked blind, with his hands
under a sheet."'3 ° James Douglas' observations in A Short Account
of the State of Midwifery in London, Westminster, &c. support the
proposition that "for reasons of modesty many women would not
agree to send for a man, nor would their husbands allow it."'' A
popular stereotype assumed that women had good grounds for pro-
tecting themselves: in much popular literature of the eighteenth-
century the man-midwife was attacked as the debaucher of virtuous
wives. 132
127. Oldham, supra note 74, at 171-72.
128. DONNISON, supra note 90, at 237.
129. Id. at 23.
130. Id. at 24.
131. DONNISON, supra note 90, at 36 (quoting JAMES DOUGLAS, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE
STATE OF MIDWIFERY IN LONDON, WESTMINSTER, &C. (1736)).
132. See id. at 41-42. However, the female modesty which discouraged the use of a male
midwife also became an excuse for limiting information available to female midwives. Dr.
Hugh Chamberlain, in his Accomplisht Midwife (1672), a translation of a French treatise,
"omitted the anatomical drawings, 'there being already severall in English; as also here and
there a passage that might offend a chast English eye."' CLARK, supra note 91, at 281. In The
Expert Midwife (1694), James McMath declares that he has
of purpose omitted a Description of the parts in a woman destined to
Generation, not being absolutely necessary to this purpose, and lest it might
seem execrable to the more chast and shamfaced through Baudiness and
Impurity of words; and have also endeavoured to keep all Modesty, and a due
Reverence to Nature ....
Id. at 282 (quoting JAMES MCMATH, THE EXPERT MIDWIFE (Edinburgh, George Mosman
1694). McMath also uses delicacy to trivialize the services performed by female midwives
in assisting male attendants:
Natural Labour, where all goes right and naturally, is the proper work of the
Midwife ... being only to sit and attend Nature's pace and progress ... and
perform some other things of smaller moment, which Physicians gave Midwifes
to do as unnecessary & indicent [sic] for them, and for the Matronal chastity.
Id. It is, perhaps, no coincidence that the leading treatise on midwifery by a woman, Mrs.
Jane Sharp's The Midwives Book, contained an "uninhibited discussion of human sexual
anatomy," although she also enjoined her reader "to use as much modesty in the perusal of
it, as I have endeavoured to do in the writing of it." Erickson, supra note 103, at 79-80
(quoting JANE SHARP, THE MIDWIVES BOOK 5 (1671)).
HOODWINKD BY CUSTOM
Motives of delicacy, therefore, may well have played a role in
the use of the jury of matrons. It seems clear, however, that delica-
cy was not the only motive for using a jury of matrons. Consonant
with Oldham's classification of the jury as an "expert" jury, conside-
rations of knowledge and skill played an important role. The
reporter of Exparte Aiscough"'3 remarks that the Chancellor's order
that "two women" examine the widow "at seasonable times" ensured
that "people of skill" would determine the issue of pregnancy.134
We have only indirect evidence of the actual procedure
employed by the jury of matrons to determine pregnancy.'35 Unlike
the ordinary trial jury, who received evidence and announced their
verdict publicly, and whose only private act was to deliberate upon
a verdict136 the jury of matrons received their evidence in private,
and acted publicly only in being sworn and in announcing their ver-
ict.'37 Quoting from a seventeenth-century treatise, The Office of
the Clerk of the Assize, Oldham notes the oath taken by the jurors
when a convicted felon claimed to be pregnant: "You as [matrons]
of this Jury shall swear that you shall search and try the Prisoner
at the Bar, whether she be quick with Child of a quick Child, and
thereof a true Verdict shall return according to the best of your
judgment; so help you God."' 38 Relying on the same source, Oldham
states that "[a] bailiff would then escort the jury and the prisoner
to a chamber where the jury would search and inspect the prisoner
. However, in Regina v. Baynton,140 a case in which the de-
endant convicted of a felony claimed to be "with child," the clerk
swore the jury of matrons as follows: "You the matrons of the jury,
shall view and diligently enquire and a true verdict give, according
to your evidence, whether Sarah Baynton be with child, quick with
child, or not. So help you God.' 4' Thus, the jury was either to
133. 24 Eng. Rep. 873 (Ch. 1730).
134. Id. at 874.
135. Likewise, we have little information about how eligible "matrons" were identified and
actually summoned. See CONSTABLE, supra note 72, at 112-27 (noting similar lack of data
regarding the mixed jury of aliens); see also 1 OLDHAM, supra note 53, at 96-97 (noting simi-
lar uncertainty and paucity of data regarding special juries, including merchant juries). The
report of Regina v. Baynton, 14 State Trials 597, 634 (Q.B. 1702) tantalizingly lists the names
of the twelve matrons; unfortunately, we have no further information about these women.
136. See 6 JACOB, supra note 108, at 301.
137. See Baynton, 14 State Trials at 634.
138. Oldham, supra note 74, at 171 (quoting THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE ASSIZE 61
(London 1682) (1660)).
139. Id.
140. 14 State Trials 597 (Q.B. 1702).
141. Id. at 634.
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"search and try" or to "view and enquire" about the fact of preg-
nancy.
In the cases involving suppositious heirs, it seems that the jury
of matrons had a more complex duty. The petitioners in Willough-
by's Case,'. Theaker's Case,'43 and Ex parte Aiscough'" all claimed
that the writ de ventre inspiciendo required not only an examina-
tion of the widow by a jury of matrons, but also the confinement and
monitoring of the widow by some of the matrons under the supervi-
sion of "knights" until her delivery, and the presence of some of the
jurors at the actual birth. 4 ' These cases suggest that the jurors'
duties may have differed at each stage of the inquiry. In Willough-
by's Case,4 ' the writ directed the sheriff to "cause the [widow] to be
viewed by twelve knights, and searched by twelve women in the
presence of the twelve knights."'47 The sheriff reported that he
"caused her to be searched," and that she was indeed pregnant. 48
The court then issued another writ ordering the sheriff
safely to keep her in such an house, and that the doors should
be well guarded; and that every day he should cause her to be
viewed by some of the women named in the writ (wherein ten
were named); and when she should be delivered, that some of
them should be with her to view her birth, whether it be male
or female, to the intent there should not be any falsity.'49
Thus, the jurors initially "searched" the woman to determine her
pregnancy, while the knights "viewed" her. The ten matrons
thereafter "viewed" her daily and "viewed" the actual birth.
142. 78 Eng. Rep. 811 (C.P. 1597).
143. 79 Eng. Rep. 595 (C.P. 1625).
144. 24 Eng. Rep. 873 (Ch. 1730).
145. The United States Supreme Court recently implied, incorrectly, that this procedure
was universally required whenever the jury of matrons was used:
If a woman was subject to capital punishment, or if a widow sought
postponement of the disposition of her husband's estate until birth of a child,
a writ de ventre inspiciendo permitted the use of a jury of matrons to examine
the woman to determine whether-she was pregnant. But even when a jury of
matrons was used, the examination took place in the presence of 12 men, who
also composed part of the jury in such cases.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1423 n.4 (1994) (citing Note, Jury Service for
Women, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 224, 224-25 (1959)). At least one scholar has also perpetuated this
error. Grossman, supra note 34, at 1133 n.102 (citing R. Justin Miller, The Woman Juror,
2 OR. L. REV. 30, 31 (1922)).
146. 78 Eng. Rep. 811 (C.P. 1597).





A similar distinction was drawn in Theaker's Case,5 ' in which
the sheriff caused the widow "to be searched."' 1 After reporting
that the woman was pregnant, the petitioner asked that the sheriff
be ordered to
keep her until she were delivered of her child, that there might
not appear to be any false or supposititious birth; and that in
the interim he should cause her to be viewed every day by
certain matrons named by the Court in the writ; and that some
of them should be at the birth of the child... .12
The Court agreed, ordering the sheriff "to cause her to be seen every
day until her delivery by two at least of the said women returned by
him; and that three of them or more should be present with her at
her delivery, so as no falshood might be in her birth."'53  The
pregnancy was initially determined by a "search," while the jury
monitored the widow's pregnancy by "viewing" her and was simply
''present" at the birth.
Finally, in Ex parte Aiscough,"' the petitioners cited a case in
which the Master of the Rolls had appointed "two midwives, who
should resort to the widow, search her, and see whether she was
with child or not, and attend at the birth."'5 5 Perhaps because the
women sent to examine the widow were specified to be "midwives,"
they were ordered not just to "be present" at the birth, but actually
to "attend" at the birth. This prospect convinced the widow that her
ruse would be discovered, and she "voluntarily came before the
Master, and declared that she was not with child."'56 The petition-
ers in Aiscough sought not only an initial determination of preg-
nancy, but also that the widow "should be confined and continue
until the time of her delivery [at her late husband's seat in
Lincolnshire], and that some woman might be always resident with
her both before, and at the birth."'57 The Chancellor postponed
impanelling the jury of matrons, ordering instead that the petition-
ers "may send two women at seasonable times, to see whether she
is with child."' 58 In this case, the women were not specifically




154. 24 Eng. Rep. 873 (Ch. 1730).
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ordered to "search" the widow; however; the link between "search"
and "see" in the Master of the Rolls case may indicate that the
Chancellor in Aiscough contemplated that the widow would be
"searched."
The verbs used in the oath in the Baynton case - "view" and
"enquire" 
- imply both seeing and hearing. In Johnson's Dictio-
nary, to "view" is "[t]o survey; to look on by way of examination" and
"[t]o see; to perceive by the eye."' 59 However, the noun "view" was
a legal term of art; in Jacob's words, "The View was for the jury to
see the land or thing claimed, and in controversy.'16 The visual
connotations of "view" are complemented by the aural connotation
of "enquire." Johnson defines "inquire" as "[t]o ask questions; to
make search; to exert curiosity on any occasion" and as "[t]o make
examination."'' Johnson defines the noun "inquirer" as "[s]earcher;
examiner; one curious and inquisitive" and as "[o]ne who interro-
gates; one who questions."'62
Johnson's use of the word "search" to help define "inquire"
suggests that the jury's search of the pregnant woman might be
nothing more than an interrogation.'63 There is some evidence,
however, that to "search" and to "try" involved more than just
asking questions. Jacob notes a case in which the sheriff of London
accompanied a jury of matrons to "a Lady's house, and into her
chamber."'64 According to Jacob, these women had been sworn "to
search, try and speak the truth whether she was with Child or
not."'65 Jacob reports that "[t]he men all went out, and the women
searched the Lady, and gave their verdict that she was with
Child."'66 The necessity for the men's leaving the room suggests
that "searching" the woman to determine pregnancy involved more
than just a verbal interrogation.
Johnson defines "search," first, as "[t]o examine; to try; to
explore; to look through"; second, as "[t]o inquire; to seek"; and
third, as "[t]o probe as a chirurgeon."'67 The possibility that the
jury of matrons conducted the sort of physical operation connoted
159. JOHNSON, supra note 116.
160. 6 JACOB, supra note 108, at 351.
161. JOHNSON, supra note 116.
162. Id.
163. See Minow, supra note 88, at 1205 (referring to "some delicacy of feeling about whose
ears should hear such intimate female matters').
164. 6 JACOB, supra note 108, at 334.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. JOHNSON, supra note 116.
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by this third definition finds support in Ex parte Aiscough,168 in
which counsel for the sixteen-year-old widow argued that "it would
be an hardship on a lady of so tender years to send a jury of
matrons to inspect her; and she being now with child, might be of
dangerous consequence, and occasion a miscarriage .... "169 This
claim that an "inspection" by the jury might cause a miscarriage not
only suggests that a physical examination of the widow was
contemplated but also raises the specter of the stereotypically
rough, clumsy, and ignorant midwife. 7 °
Jacob does not define "search" but defines "searcher" as "[a]n
officer of the customs, whose business it is to search and examine
ships outward-bound, if they have any prohibited or uncustomed
good on board, &c."'' The image of the customs officer roaming the
ship, entering each compartment in search of contraband, correlates
nicely with the image of the jury of matrons, probing the widow's
body in search, not of contraband, but of a legitimate heir. Also
suggestive in this regard is Johnson's second definition of
"searcher": "Officer in London appointed to examine the bodies of
the dead, and report the cause of death."'72 As authority for this
definition, Johnson quotes from Graunt's Bills of Mortality: 'The
searchers, who are ancient matrons sworn to their office, repair to
the place where the dead corps lies, and by view of the same, and
other inquiries, examine by what disease the corps died."'73 In the
civic and legal realms, it seems, women were given authority only
over bodies, dead or pregnant.
Thus, the jury of matrons institutionalized the association in
Western culture between women and bodies. The association
between women and the body dates back at least to classical
Greece: 'The early Greeks saw women's capacity to conceive as
connecting them with the fertility of Nature."'74 While women were
associated with nature, procreation, and the body, men were
associated with their opposite, or in Francis Bacon's view, their
conqueror, the rational mind. 7 ' As Sherry B. Ortner points out,
Western culture has also viewed women as mediators between the
168. 24 Eng. Rep. 873 (Ch. 1730).
169. Id. at 874.
170. See DONNISON, supra note 90, at 45; Erickson, supra note 103, at 74-75.
171. 6 JACOB, supra note 108, at 37.
172. JOHNSON, supra note 116.
173. Id.
174. GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE MAN OF REASON: "MALE" AND "FEMALE" IN WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY 2 (1984).
175. See id. at 10-17.
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realm of nature and the male realm of culture.1 6 Conceptually,
therefore, the jury of matrons can be seen as mediators between the
ultimate symbol of male transcendence, the courtroom, and the
ultimate symbol of female bondage to nature, pregnancy.'7 7 When
the issue of a woman's pregnancy becomes legally relevant and a
pregnant female body literally intrudes into the transcendent space
of the English courtroom, the law must employ females, acting in
their role as mediators between nature and culture, to examine and
adjudge the intruder.
In their role as mediators, the matrons are accepted by the law,
but still suspected of complicity in feminine subversion of the male
order. In Oldham's view, this suspicion was justified in capital
cases by the spurious claims of pregnancy frequently made by
female prisoners. 7 1 Of course, the very existence of the writ de
ventre inspiciendo presupposed the widow's duplicity. Jacob states
that the writ is available "[w]here a Widow is suspected to feign
herself with Child, in order to produce a supposititious heir to the
estate."'179 In Ex parte Aiscough,80 the Chancellor declared that the
writ "is for the security of the next ... heir, to guard him or her
against fraudulent or supposititious births."'"' This suspicion of the
widow is also exemplified in Willoughby's Case,'82 where the court
ordered that the sheriff keep the widow in a "well guarded" house
and cause her to be "viewed" by some of the matrons "everyday.' 83
Likewise, in Theaker's Case,' the court ordered the widow to be
"seen every day until her delivery by two at least" of the matrons. 85
The courts' actions in these cases demonstrate not only
suspicion of the widow, but also suspicion of the matrons. In each
of the cases, the court ordered that more than one woman view the
widow periodically and that more than one attend at the actual
176. Sherry B. Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?, in WOMEN, CULTURE,
AND SOCIETY 67, 84-85 (Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo & Louise Lamphere eds., 1974).
177. See id. at 73-76, 84-85.
178. See Oldham, supra note 74, at 171 n.190. In support of this point, Oldham cites a
passage from Moll Flanders: "[W]hen Moll was herself imprisoned in Newgate, a fellow
prisoner explained that she was not under immediate threat of execution because 'I pleaded
my belly, but I am no more quick with child than the judge that tried me, and I expect to be
called down next session."' Id. (quoting DANIEL DEFOE, THE FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES
OF THE FAMOUS MOLL FLANDERS 262 (Modern Library ed. 1950) (1722)).
179. 6JACOB, supra note 108, at 333.
180. 24 Eng. Rep. 873 (Ch. 1730).
181. Id. at 874.
182. 78 Eng. Rep. 811 (C.P. 1597).
183. Id. at 811.
184. 79 Eng. Rep. 595 (C.P. 1625).
185. Id. at 595.
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birth.'86  The implicit fear of a female conspiracy to pass an
illegitimate child off as legitimate derives, of course, from the
woman's role as the conduit for property. As Johnson stated, "the
chastity of women [is] of the utmost importance, as all property
depends upon it .... " 87 Thus, the jury of matrons was a necessary
evil for determining the widow's pregnancy, but given the high
stakes, the law took steps to ensure that transcendent legal rules
of inheritance would not be disrupted by the activities of either the
widow or the matrons.
Our examination of the jury of matrons has revealed two
pervasive themes: the relegation of women's judgment to issues
surrounding other women's bodies, and uncertainty about whether
women were allowed even this limited power in the English
courtroom because of their expertise or because of their modesty.
In a little-noted reference to women's exclusion from the jury, a
popular eighteenth-century writer, Richard Steele, rehearses the
same issues. In a 1709 issue of The Tatler,'88 Steele addresses a
reader's complaint about "crowds of women" gathering at the Old
Bailey to hear rape trials: "I can't tell," Steele writes, "who are so
much concern'd in that Part of the Law as that [female] Sex ....
they being the only Persons liable to such Insults."'89 He goes
further, however, noting women's exclusion from serving on
criminal juries and proposing that they be permitted to serve in
rape cases:
The Law to me indeed seems a little defective in this Point; and
it is a very great Hardship, that this Crime, which is committed
by Men only, should have Men only on their Jury. I humbly
therefore propose, That on future Trials of this Sort, half of the
Twelve may be Women; and those such whose Faces are well
known to have taken Notes, or may be suppos'd to remember
what happen'd in former Trials in the same Place.' 9°
186. See id. (stating that the widow should be seen "every day" by "two at least" of the
matrons, with "three of them or more" to be present at the birth); Willoughby's Case, 78 Eng.
Rep. at 811 ("some of the women" should view her and be present at the birth); Ex parte
Aiscough, 24 Eng. Rep. at 874 (requiring "two women" to visit the widow "at seasonable
times").
187. JAMES BOSwELL, THE IAFE OF JOHNSON 702 (R.W. Chapman ed., The World's Classics
1980) (1791).
188. RICHARD STEELE, THE TATLER NO. 84 (Oct. 22, 1709), reprinted in 2 THE TATLER 32
(Donald F. Bond ed., 1987).
189. Id. at 32.
190. Id.
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Obviously, Steele is drawing upon the concept of the mixed alien
jury. In doing so, he alludes to both the issue of expertise and the
issue of interest. To insure the jury's expertise, he proposes "the
learned Androgyne" as a "good Fore-woman of the Pannel" because
she "(by long Attendance) understands as much Law and Anatomy
as is necessary" in rape cases. 9' With respect to the community of
interest between the female jurors and the victim of the crime,
Steele insists that until such mixed juries are instituted, women
should forgo their right to view rape trials, "For to what End can it
be that they should be present at such Examinations, when they
can only be perplex'd with a Fellow-feeling for the Injur'd, without
any Power to avenge their Sufferings." '192
If Steele is serious here, he is making a radical suggestion, the
expansion of women's jury service to include a certain class of
criminal cases. But a thorough consideration of Steele's article
reveals an unmistakable satiric tone that undermines the sincerity
of his proposal. The first hint of satire comes in Steele's defense of
women's attendance at rape trials:
Nor indeed do I think it more unreasonable that they should be
inquisitive on such Occasions, than Men of Honour when one is
try'd for killing another in a Duel. It is very natural to enquire
how the fatal Pass was made, that we may the better defend
our selves when we come to be attack'd. 193
By equating a rape and a duel, especially in deploying the double
entendre of 'Tatal Pass" (the thrusting sword/phallus proving fatal
to the opponent's life/honor), Steele casts a satiric shade upon his
otherwise apparently serious suggestion that women of honor could
learn how to protect themselves from rape by learning how other
rapes were accomplished. For one thing, a man of honour would not
have "come to be attack'd" in a duel; he would have agreed with his
opponent to engage. This element of mutuality, along with the
vision of a duel as formal, ritualized swordplay (sex-play), makes
the duel a troublingly inapposite figure for rape. The overall effect
of this passage is the slightly salacious suggestion that women who
wish to view rape trials do so from a prurient interest in an event
that constitutes a ritualized, mutually agreed-upon encounter. By
deprecating the seriousness of the crime of rape, Steele inevitably
undermines the seriousness of his proposal for a female mixed jury.
191. Id. at 32-33.
192. Id. at 33.
193. Id. at 32.
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As the article continues, Steele also deprecates the intellectual
capacity of women. He notes that "[s]everal eminent Ladies
appear'd lately at the Court of Justice" at a rape trial and "with
great Patience and Attention stay'd the whole Trials of two
Persons." '194 Steele's emphasis on the "whole" trials and the
viewers' "great Patience and Attention" (one can surely hear the
arch emphasis that seems called for by the words "great" and
"whole") suggests that such patience and attention on the part of
women is unusual and, therefore, noteworthy. The implicit
stereotype of the flighty female appears again in the article. After
mentioning the "unnecessary Pain which the Fair Ones give
themselves" by exercising their "Fellow-feeling for the Injur'd,
without any Power to avenge their Sufferings," Steele recites: "I
have known a young Woman shriek out at some Parts of the
Evidence; and have frequently observ'd, That when the Proof very
grew particular and strong, there has been such an universal
Flutter of Fans, that one would think the whole Female Audience
were falling into Fits."'95 Here we have the eighteenth-century
adumbration of the 1919 Parliament's fear that the evidence in
certain types of cases would prove unsuitable for female jurors'
ears. Steele depicts the intellectual delicacy of women as manifest
in physical excess. If women are apt to shriek at evidence in rape
trials, they can hardly be fit to sit in judgment at those trials.
Steele's next image, so strikingly highlighted by the proliferation of
alliterative 'T' sounds (and surely Steele's choice of consonant is not
without significance) - the fluttering fans of the females falling
into fits - likewise impugns the fitness of women for jury service.
Steele mocks the suggestion that women have any proper role in
judicial decisionmaking by emphasizing that quintessentially
female accessory, the fan. The suggestion of coyness turns to
lasciviousness as, first, blushes and giggles are hidden behind fans,
which then must be used (when the proof turns "particular and
strong," adjectives resonating with phallic significance) to disperse
the heat generated in the women by the spectacle; and, finally, the
state of incoherence and irrationality signified by "Fits." From one
susceptible female actually observed shrieking out at the evidence,
Steele moves to a "universal" phenomenon affecting the "whole"
female audience such that "one would think" they had "fall[en] into
Fits." From the actual behavior of a single female, Steele moves to
194. Id.
195. Id. at 33.
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the posited behavior of an entire female population. All of these
moves call into question women's fitness for jury service.
But again we are left with the question of why women are unfit
for jury service. Although, like other eighteenth-century writers,
Steele refuses to be perfectly explicit, he hints that jury service
requires a degree of knowledge and intellectual capacity that
women are simply incapable of achieving (at least, without becom-
ing the stereotypical "unsex'd female"). 9 ' By naming the proposed
"Fore-woman" of his mixed jury "Androgyne," Steele, like other
writers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,197 clearly
suggests that jury service requires a woman to take on male
characteristics. The fact that she is qualified as "Fore-woman" by
'long attendance" suggests both an unbecoming interest in unsa-
vory cases and a concomitant neglect of more fitting duties in other
settings.'98 In the article's final peroration, Steele makes explicit
the gendered construction of intellect and implicitly links learning
with the loss of that modesty so prized in respectable women:
In short, I must tell my Female Readers, and they may take an
old Man's word for it, That there is nothing in Women so
graceful and becoming as Modesty: It adds Charms to their
Beauty, and gives a new Softness to their Sex. Without it,
Simplicity and Innocence appear rude, Reading and good Sense
masculine, Wit and Humour lascivious.'99
From Steele's satirical treatment of the female mixed jury, we begin
to perceive a more complex relationship between the issues of
women's intellect, their capacity for judging, their delicacy, and
their expertise in female bodily processes. We can continue to
explore the interrelationship among these issues by turning our
attention to another popular eighteenth-century literary work,
Charlotte Lennox's 1752 novel, The Female Quixote. In this work,
we discover a sustained but subtle critique of stereotypes of women,
like Steele's, that figure them as intellectually inferior and
ineligible for education.
196. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 43.
197. See id. at 43-56.
198. Interestingly, seventy-five years later, in an adumbration of the separate spheres
theory, the Duchess of Devonshire was ridiculed in cartoons showing her out campaigning
while her husband, the Duke, diapered the baby. See COLLEY, supra note 54, at 245.
199. STEELE, supra note 188, at 33 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 4:1
HOODWINIKD BY CUSTOM
III. THE FEMALE QUIXOTE
The good Doctor was extremely surpriz'd at this Discourse: He
was beginning to think her again delirious; but Arabella added
to this Account such sensible Reasoning... that the Doctor left
her in strange Embarrassment, not knowing how to account for
a Mind at once so enlighten'd, and so ridiculous.
200
Charlotte Lennox's 1752 novel, The Female Quixote, tells the
story of seventeen-year-old Arabella, the beautiful, virtuous, and
intelligent daughter of the Marquis. Her mother's early death, her
father's retirement from the royal court, and her upbringing in the
seclusion of the countryside lead Arabella to rely for companionship
on books, primarily the chivalric romances of La Calpren~de and
Madame de Scudery. These romances generally focus on the
outlandish vicissitudes of the love affairs between strong, bellicose
heroes and beautiful, virtuous (and, often, politically powerful)
heroines. Arabella does not recognize the romances as fictions but
instead reads them as true histories. She interprets her own
experiences in light of the romances, seeing herself as a heroine and
those around her as romance characters: the gardener, a disguised
prince; a London woman who has come into the country to give
birth, an incognito princess; and a gentlemanly visitor to the
neighborhood, a ravisher. Once Arabella is introduced to the suitor
whom her father has chosen, her cousin Glanville, Arabella's
interpretations impinge more urgently on reality as she enforces
from Glanville the behavior appropriate to a hero of romance. As
she moves into the world, travelling to Bath and London with
Glanville, his father, Sir Charles, and his sister, Charlotte, her
romantic interpretations of other people's behavior begin to affect
her reputation. Finally, when she nearly drowns after throwing
herself into the Thames to escape several male horsemen whom she
perceives as ravishers, Arabella is persuaded by a clergyman to
relinquish her belief in the truth of the romances. The novel ends
with her companionate marriage to Glanville.
At the heart of the novel lies a tension, an ambivalence, an
incommensurability. Like its forebear, Don Quixote, the novel
certainly satirizes the extravagant romances of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, yet it just as certainly critiques the reality
that is juxtaposed to the romance world. In this way, Ronald
Paulson suggests, Lennox's novel shares the central paradox of the
200. CHARLOTTE LENNOX, THE FEMALE QUIXOTE OR THE ADVENTURES OF ARABELLA 367
(Margaret Dalziel ed., 1989) (1752).
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genre: "Don Quixote becomes both an attack on a false ideal which,
if practiced, would lead men to attack innocent folk with lances, and
an attack on the real world in which the true. ideal is unattain-
able." '' That is, according to Paulson, "the illusion and the reality
become satiric comments on each other. 20 2
But the protagonist of Lennox's novel is not just a quixote -
she is a female quixote, and the gendered nature of the novel has
intrigued critics who seek to identify the peculiar satiric comment
the novel makes. Critics of the novel consistently note the marked
ambivalence with which Lennox depicts her heroine, Arabella.
Paulson remarks that "Arabella contains both aspects of the
Quixote syndrome, vice and corrective. 20 3 Judith Sloman asserts,
"While seeming to say that Arabella is ridiculous, [Lennox] shows
time and time again that Arabella is morally and intellectually
superior to most of the people around her."20 4 In Deborah Ross'
words, "Apart from her delusions - or, rather, along with them -
she also has wit and intelligence.""2 5 According to Laurie
Langbauer, the tension in the novel corresponds to a fundamental
division in Arabella's identity: "Crucial to the book's depiction of
her, and its derision of romance, is its assertion of a natural,
sensible Arabella, superior to and distinct from her romantic
self."20 6
Langbauer's reference to Arabella's "romantic self' indicates
the degree to which character and genre are paralleled in criticism
of The Female Quixote. The link is explicitly made by Langbauer:
"The Female Quixote both mocks and lauds its heroine's quixotism,
and the way it ridicules romance actually exposes the attraction of
that form."2 7 These critics agree that the element of social critique
that destabilizes the satire resides in the alternative world of
romances, the world the novel also satirizes. The qualities that
make romance attractive to Arabella are the qualities missing from
eighteenth-century women's lives. Langbauer emphasizes the
escapist potential of romance: "No matter how much the novel
201. RONALD PAULSON, SATIRE AND THE NOVEL IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 31
(1967).
202. Id. at 33.
203. Id. at 275.
204. Judith Sloman, The Female Quixote as an Eighteenth Century Character Type, 4
TRANSACTIONS OF THE SAMUEL JOHNSON SOCIETY OF THE NORTHWEST 86, 94 (1972).
205. DEBORAH ROSS, THE EXCELLENCE OF FALSEHOOD: ROMANCE, REALISM, AND WOMEN'S
CONTRIBUTION TO THE NOVEL 109 (1991).
206. Laurie Langbauer, Romance Revised: Charlotte Lennox's The Female Quixote, 18
NOVEL 29, 32 (1984).
207. Id. at 30.
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travesties romance, it also presents romance as what gets Arabella
out of the boredom and seclusion of her father's house, and when
she abandons romance at the conventionally happy ending, she is
trapped again, into marriage and submission."2 °8 Patricia Meyer
Spacks is more explicit about the particular aspect of society
critiqued by the novel: "Like Don Quixote's yearning for a different
world, Arabella's wish to live by the rules of romance criticizes the
standards of her society especially as they restrict female possibil-
ity. '20 9 According to Spacks, the novel acknowledges eighteenth-
century women's "psychic need for alternatives to a socially defined
state of meaningless and powerless activity."'21 The alternative
presented by romance is "a world in which [a young woman] can
claim enormous significance and power, 21' specifically, power in
"the public sphere."
21 2
Thus, in The Female Quixote, Lennox satirizes the world of
romances as silly and extravagant while critiquing contemporary
society by promoting romance as a world in which women can find
community, meaningful activity, and public roles. Her ability to
satirize romances as unreliable models while promoting them as
alternative world-views depends upon the subtle distinctions made
throughout the novel among the various aspects of the ro-
mances - on the one hand, their improbable plots, their extrava-
gant language, their stereotypical characterizations, and on the
other, their depiction of women as wielding power not only over
their unhappy suitors but also over nations and armies.
Similar subtle distinctions come into play in Lennox's treat-
ment of Arabella's character, aspects of which are both lauded and
satirized. As Deborah Ross points out, "A reader seeking wisdom
from The Female Quixote would often be unsure whether to view
Arabella as a model or as a warning. 21 3 While critics have had no
difficulty identifying the "vice" Arabella embodies - an unrealistic
and hazardous world-view - they have been slower to suggest what
"corrective" she represents. Critics have found in Arabella no
analogue to Don Quixote's idealism; they have failed to identify a
correlative to her folly that is sufficiently compelling to account for
208. Id. at 44.
209. Patricia Meyer Spacks, The Subtle Sophistry of Desire: Dr. Johnson and The Female
Quixote, 85 MOD. PHILOLOGY 532, 533 (1988).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 535.
212. Id. at 541.
213. Deborah Ross, Mirror, Mirror: The Didactic Dilemma of The Female Quixote, 27
STUD. IN ENG. LITERATURE 455, 466 (1987).
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what Spacks calls "the poignance of her characterization 2 14 and
what Ross claims as "Lennox's real sympathy for Arabella. '215 If we
are to see The Female Quixote as a complete example of quixotean
satire, we must discover this missing term in the equation. We
must find in Arabella a positive quality that exists simultaneously
with her folly, that correlates with the positive attributes of the
romance world, and that constitutes a desideratum which critiques
eighteenth-century English society.
The most obvious corrective to what critics sometimes call
Arabella's "madness ' is her conversion and inevitable compan-
ionate marriage to Glanville. But if Arabella the compliant young
matron constitutes the corrective to Arabella the ridiculous
misreader of romances, then the satire does not reside in Lennox's
portrayal of her heroine in the same way that it resides in her
depiction of romance. In this reading, the novel becomes a sort of
bildungsroman, "in which a character progresses from a mistaken
adherence to illusions to a realistic and happy acceptance of life." '217
But, as Paulson notes, the "Quixote syndrome, when it appears
whole, involves a partial recantation. It says that Quixote is totally
wrong, that he is mad and the world is real; and yet in a sense he
is right and the world is unreal or at least wicked and unimpor-
tant." 8 If the "corrective" represented by Arabella is her conver-
sion and marriage, there is merely movement from vice to correc-
tive, not the simultaneous critique and celebration required for
quixotic satire.
Critics like Laurie Langbauer, who link the portrayal of
Arabella with the genre of romance, view her growth as an implicit
critique of the romance form: "The novel... associates the dangers
of romance with sins of women, and through this association
clinches its derision of the form .... Lennox accepts the derision of
romance; her strategy is to separate Arabella from it, to educate her
out of romance and dissociate her from its realm."21 9  Still, in
Langbauer's view, Arabella remains aligned with romance until the
end; thus, the end of her story signals Lennox's disillusionment
with romance as a liberating possibility for women: "[T]he novel
ultimately shows that women and romance are so bound that
214. Spacks, supra note 209, at 533.
215. Ross, supra note 213, at 461.
216. E.g., James J. Lynch, Romance and Realism in Charlotte Lennox's The Female
Quixote, 14 ESSAYS IN LITERATURE 51, 61 (1987).
217. Elaine M. Kauvar, Jane Austen and The Female Quixote, 2 STUD. NOVEL 211, 214
(1970).
218. PAULSON, supra note 201, at 33.
219. Langbauer, supra note 206, at 39, 41.
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separating the two ends the story. It suggests a positive, although
wistful, alignment of them - if romance were available to women
unmediated, it might be a source of power, and a ground from
which they could speak.""22 Elizabeth Kraft goes further, so firmly
linking Arabella with the romance form that in her view, Arabella's
trajectory from quixote to matron indicates the impossibility of a
female protagonist's sustaining a quixotic satire: 'There is no
possibility of a feminine version of the story of Don Quixote; there
is only the alternative of another masculine tale - the sentimental
tale of feminine values, appropriated and thereby permanently
altered by the masculine, just as any dominant culture absorbs and
fundamentally changes weaker, alien elements." '221
For these critics, the end of the novel criticizes contemporary
society for denying to women the "pleasures of the irrational,
mocked in the novel as romantic foolery." '222 Yet reading The
Female Quixote as a generic story in which the novel (masculine
reality) defeats the romance (feminine irrationality) fails to account
sufficiently for the positive elements in Lennox's depiction of
Arabella. (Also, as we shall see, this reading derives from an
ahistorical understanding of the relationship between women and
romance invoked by the novel). Indeed, Langbauer herself sees the
"natural, sensible Arabella" as "superior to... her romantic self,"
and critics have generally acknowledged that the primary source of
the sympathy with which Arabella is portrayed is her intellect. For
example, Katharine Rogers notes, "Arabella's conspicuous superior-
ity suggests that she is not merely an addict of silly fiction, but a
woman of intellect capable of rising above conventional limitations,
whether frivolous or humdrum." '223
But even while acknowledging Arabella's intellect, critics have
been slow to suggest an association between Arabella's intellectual
powers and the corrective she represents. Leland Warren asserts,
"[I]t is Arabella's non-romantic speeches that Lennox expects us to
see as proof of her character's superior merit. But these Johnsonian
speeches that so impress her hearers have little to do with Arabella
herself."'224 Langbauer also dismisses the possibility that Arabella's
intellect represents an alternative to her folly:
220. Id. at 31.
221. ELIZABETH KRAFT, CHARACTER & CONSCIOUSNESS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMIC
FICTION 98 (1992).
222. Langbauer, supra note 206, at 35.
223. KATHARINE M. ROGERS, FEMINISM IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 110 (1982).
224. Leland E. Warren, Of the Conversation of Women: The Female Quixote and the
Dream of Perfection, 11 STUD. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CULTURE 367, 374 (1982).
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[W]e get very little of Arabella's conversation that is not
romantic, and the little we do get shows an Arabella no more
"real" because less literary than the self drawn from romance.
The speeches which are to impress us are, if anything, even
more artificial - set-pieces modelled on historical writers or
moral essays.225
Because these critics see Arabella's Johnsonian speeches as the only
evidence of her intellectual powers, they find her intellect too
weakly depicted in the text to serve as the corrective to her
romantic folly.
But the same quality in Arabella that is satirized is also
celebrated: her readiness to interpret reality in light of romance
precedents. As Ronald Paulson notes, the novel focuses "on the
heroine's mind and the way it operates." '226 Just as Lennox's satire
of the romances requires subtle distinctions between their positive
and negative attributes, so does the satire of Arabella depend upon
a subtle distinction between the positive and negative qualities of
her intellect. Although her insistence on enforcing romantic
behavior on herself and everyone around her is condemned as
dangerous, her interpretive powers are depicted with approval. It
is her premises, not her processes, that the novel subjects to
ridicule. Her mind, in the Doctor's words, is both "enlighten'd" and
"ridiculous," enlightened in its powers, ridiculous in its results.227
The disparity between the world of romance and the real world
corresponds to an incommensurability between Arabella's inner
world and the reality of eighteenth-century England: her powers
exceed her possibilities. Although the novel shows her intellect as
equal to any man's, the novel just as clearly shows that the realm
available for the exercise of that intellect is limited. The quixotean
satire of Arabella resides in this tension between processes and
premises, powers and possibilities.
In D.A. Miller's terms, the "disequilibrium" that renders
Arabella herself "narratable"22 is this disparity between her acute
mental powers and the restricted scope that society permits for the
exercise of those powers. Judith Dorn Depuydt has characterized
this disequilibrium as the "conflict in a woman's relation to her
225. Langbauer, supra note 206, at 33.
226. PAULSON, supra note 201, at 277.
227. See LENNOX, supra note 200, at 367.
228. D.A. MILLER, NARRATIVE AND ITS DISCONTENTS: PROBLEMS OF CLOSURE IN THE
TRADITIONAL NOVEL 109 (1981).
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community's assumptions about the forms of interpretation that
make common sense." '229 Like Paulson, who sees the novel as posing
"an epistemological problem,"23 Depuydt correctly emphasizes the
role of conflicting epistemologies in the novel. Depuydt, however,
correctly sees in Lennox's portrayal of Arabella's subjectivity an
emphasis, not so much on her idiosyncrasy, but rather on her
representativeness. As Laurie Langbauer puts it, "the strength of
The Female Quixote is that it tells us something not just about
romance or Arabella, but about all women." '231 Langbauer's
statement should be qualified, however: The Female Quixote tells
us something, not about "all women" in the material historical
sense, but about "Woman" in the conceptual sense, as convention-
ally represented in eighteenth-century discourse. The paradox
noted by the good Doctor in the epigraph to this section describes
not just the mind of Arabella, but the way in which the mind of
Woman was figured in the mid-eighteenth century. The fissure
opened up by these two incongruent qualities of mind - the
enlightened and the ridiculous - opens up a space in which a
young woman's encounters with reality can be narrated; and in
Arabella's encounters with reality, the novel engages the issue of
how, or whether, the post-Cartesian woman could be accommodated
in eighteenth-century English society.
Previous critics of The Female Quixote have been too inatten-
tive to history; they have been too complacent, merely noting the
limitations on women's legal and social position in eighteenth-
century England without thoroughly analyzing the ways in which
women's subordination was figured and the terms in which it was
debated in the years before the novel was published. It is impossi-
ble to understand Lennox's portrayal of Arabella without an
examination of the historical context in which this portrayal is
grounded. Deborah Ross has identified "a dominant trait of the
women's novel of the mid-eighteenth century" as "a pragmatic
didacticism... in which what is clearly but inevitably differs from
what should be." '232 This gap between the real and the ideal also
underlies satire.233 Whether The Female Quixote is seen as a mid-
eighteenth-century "woman's novel" or as a satire, we are faced
229. Judith Dorn Depuydt, Material Contentions: Women and Intellectual Community
in Later Eighteenth-Century English Narrative 72 (1992) (dissertation, Yale University).
230. Id. at 31.
231. Langbauer, supra note 206, at 40.
232. Ross, supra note 213, at 464-65.
233. See PAULSON, supra note 201, at 15.
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with what Jerome McGann calls the "question of referentiality. 234
The gap between real and ideal forces us to undertake a historical
inquiry: What was the reality at the time the novel was
published?2 5 What might have been seen as the competing ideal to
that reality, and why?
In constructing her heroine, Lennox drew heavily upon a non-
fictional discourse of female subjectivity associated with Mary
Astell (1668-1731), her colleagues Sarah Fyge Egerton (1670-1723)
and Judith Drake (fi. 1696), and her successors. In depicting the
conflicting impulses of Arabella's mentality, Lennox pervasively
employs a dichotomy between Custom and Reason, terms that
explicitly refer to Mary Astell's formulation of the anomalous
position of post-Cartesian women in early modern England. Astell,
as well as her contemporaries and her successors, hoped to benefit
from the egalitarian implications of Descartes' disembodiment of
Reason; however, in arguing for women's intellectual equality, these
writers struggled to overcome the inertia of Custom, which they
identified as the source of women's social and legal subordination.
Thematically, Lennox's depiction of Arabella engages, in
Depuydt's words, "contemporary epistemological concern with the
construction of common realities. 236 In addition, Depuydt asserts,
the narrative is conditioned upon the fact that contemporary society
"customarily differentiates [women] from the community of
reasonable men. 23 7 This differentiation existed most powerfully in
the legal system, in the near-total exclusion of women from
participation in the paradigmatic "community of reasonable men"
whose sole purpose was the "construction of common realities" -
the jury.
It is to this point that the novel implicates the sociohistorical
reality of the exclusion of women from juries. Like a juror, Arabella
tries to apply the laws that she recognizes as authoritative to the
facts of a given situation as she perceives them. Her interpreta-
tions, however, carry no authority. Arabella is, in essence, disquali-
fied from serving on the jury of her own life. The meaning of events
in her life is, instead, determined by the "community of reasonable
men" that surrounds her. Because Arabella wants to do in her own
234. Jerome J. McGann, Introduction to HISTORIcAL STUDIES AND LITERARY CRITICISM 3,
3 (Jerome J. McGann ed., 1985).
235. I recognize, of course, that we can never recreate the reality, or the multiple realities,
of any past time. I am really asking what representations of women, and specifically women
as intellectual beings, were available to Lennox and how she invoked those models.
236. Depuydt, supra note 229, at 17.
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life what English jurors were asked to do in a trial, understanding
the cultural resonance of Arabella's loss of the privilege of judging
will shed light on the cultural meaning of the exclusion of women
from all juries other than the jury of matrons. If English law had
entirely excluded women from jury service, we could argue that
Lennox was challenging this limitation on women's role by showing
that Arabella, if properly instructed on the applicable law, could
energetically apply that law to the facts. However, the existence of
the jury of matrons confounds any simplistic argument. The jury
of matrons inscribed within the legal system the preeminent
convention of the construction of women's subjectivity in the
eighteenth century: their association with the Body, rather than
the Mind. We also find this dichotomy between Mind and Body in
the themes and language of the novel.
Throughout the novel, Lennox foregrounds the issue of
Arabella's authority to interpret reality. In Ronald Paulson's
words, the novel focuses consistently "on the heroine's mind and the
way it operates.""2 ' Both early and late in the novel we are told that
Arabella has "a most happy Facility in accommodating every Inci-
dent to her own Wishes and Conceptions" 239 and "a strange Facility
in reconciling every Incident to her own fantastick Ideas. ' 24" The
novel depicts Arabella as an eager interpreter of people and things
around her. She has confidence in her interpretive powers; she
constantly interrupts the other characters because she is certain
that she knows what they will say. As Paulson notes, "her favorite
word is 'questionless."' 241' Despite the other characters' impatience
with her "Foibles, ' 24 2 Arabella's moments of greatest dignity are
frequently those in which she confidently enforces even her most
unrealistic interpretations. For example, in contrast to the other
characters, only Arabella can deal calmly with Selvin's denial that
he intended to declare his love for her:
So formal a Denial... extremely perplex'd Sir Charles, and
fill'd Mr. Glanville with inconceivable Shame -
Miss Glanville enjoy'd their Disturbance, and full of an ill-
natur'd Triumph, endeavour'd to look Arabella into Confusion:
But that Lady not being at all discompos'd by this Declaration
of Mr. Selvin's, having accounted for it already, replied with
great Calmness,
238. PAULSON, supra note 201, at 277.
239. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 25.
240. Id. at 340.
241. PAULSON, supra note 201, at 276.
242. See, e.g., LENNOX, supra note 200, at 54.
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Sir, Tis easy to see thro' the Artifice of your disclaiming
any Passion for me ....243
Arabella's power to "account for" Selvin's behavior enables her to
maintain her dignity and to thwart Charlotte's hateful attempt to
sabotage her composure.
Despite her fondness for "questionless" conclusions, however,
Arabella is always willing to revise her interpretations if they prove
wrong. A pattern that pervades the novel is Arabella's reaching a
tentative conclusion, having that conclusion challenged, and then
revising her conclusion to accommodate the challenge. For
example, Arabella believes that Hervey "would entertain some fatal
Design 2 44 because of her return of his unopened letter. When Lucy
reports that he merely laughed, Arabella is "extremely surprised,"
but adroitly revises her interpretation to fit his reaction: "Doubt-
less, resumed she, having taken a little Time to consider of so
strange a Phaenomenon, he laughed, because his Reason was
disturbed at the sudden Shock he received .... ,245 Similarly, after
Arabella banishes Selvin from England, she holds out her hand to
him, "supposing he would kneel to kiss it, and bathe it with his
Tears. 246 When he doesn't, "after standing a Moment in this
Posture, and finding her Hand untouch'd, she concluded Grief had
depriv'd him of his Senses, and that he would shortly fall into a
Swoon ... 247
Because both the initial and the revised interpretations derive
from romance, Lennox presents both as equally mistaken. Yet
Arabella's romantic interpretations are often fundamentally true.
For example, when Selvin and Tinsel send their letters of apology
to Arabella, Lucy assures Arabella that they are not love letters.
Arabella nevertheless refuses to receive them: "You are a simple
Wench, said Arabella smiling: You may depend upon it, all Letters
directed to me, must contain Matters of Love and Gallantry; and
those I am not permitted to receive. 2 48 This characteristically
absolute statement is essentially true. With one exception - her
uncle's letter informing her of her cousins' impending arrival2 49 _
all of the letters Arabella receives during the novel do indeed
contain 'Matters of Love and Gallantry" because everyone in the
243. Id. at 312.
244. Id. at 15.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 313.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 293.
249. See id. at 79.
[Vol. 4:1
HOODWINKD BY CUSTOM
novel sees her primarily as an object of male desire.2 50 Thus, while
deriving from the romantic notions the novel satirizes, Arabella's
certainty about the contents of Tinsel's and Selvin's letters is
justified.
Similarly, Arabella's ostensible misinterpretation of the
highwaymen on the road to Bath actually reflects the reasonable-
ness of her interpretive process. Glanville, Sir Charles, and the
servants immediately identify the horsemen as highwaymen, 25 1 and
the narrator endorses their interpretation, calling the horsemen
"Highwaymen" and "Robbers." ' 2 Arabella, however, without access
to the narrator's knowledge, sees only 'Three or Four Men of a
genteel Appearance. 253 When they gallop toward the coach, she
believes they are cavaliers coming to rescue her and Charlotte from
the men whom they must see as abductors.254 When Arabella
shouts from the coach to assure the horsemen that she and
Charlotte are not being abducted, the narrator tells us that the men
"were near enough to hear Arabella's Voice, though they could not
distinguish her Words." '255 According to the narrator, the men
"gazed on her with great Surprize; and, finding they would be very
well received, thought fit to abandon their Enterprize, and galloped
away as fast as they were able." '256 Arabella's reaction is interest-
ing; the horsemen's departure leads her to revise her interpretation:
"Since these Men, said Arabella, did not come to deliver us, out of
a mistaken Notion, that we were carried away by Force, it must
necessarily follow, they had some bad Design ... .,,2" This "bad
Design," she clarifies, was "to carry us away.' '2s 8
Arabella cannot know that the horsemen did not hear her
disclaimer, nor can she have the narrator's knowledge of the
motives for their departure (the well-armed men surrounding the
coach and, perhaps, the spectacle of a lady leaning out the window,
shouting). Her re-interpretation of their "Design" indicates that
their leaving at that point in the encounter was uncharacteristic of
rescuers. Had the men been rescuers, Arabella's behavior implies,
they would have persisted despite her disclaimer. According to the
reality enforced by the narrator, of course, her identification of the
250. See id. at 13, 174, 194, 255, 355.
251. See id. at 257.
252. Id. at 258.
253. Id. at 257.
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men's "bad Design" is just as erroneous as her identification of their
"good Design." But Arabella eventually gets the best of the
argument. To Glanville's assertion that "these Men had no other
Design, than to rob us of our Money," '259 Arabella replies:
Were these Cavaliers, who appeared to be in so handsome a
Garb, that I took them for Persons of prime Quality, were they
Robbers? I have been strangely mistaken, it seems: However,
I apprehend there is no Certainty, that your Suspicions are
true; and it may still be as I say, that they either came to rescue
or carry us away.2'6
Glanville wisely "change[s] the Discourse" '261 since Arabella's point
here seems unanswerable. The others' interpretation of the
horsemen is not true in any absolute sense. In the others' view,
given their experience, the horsemen are more likely highwaymen
than either rescuers or ravishers. However, in Arabella's view,
given her experience, it is much more probable that the men are
rescuers or ravishers; she undoubtedly knows as little about
highwaymen as she knows about "Scandal" '62 and horse races.263
Of course, Arabella's interpretations are not always so reason-
able. One example is her belief that her uncle is a suitor (a
"misinterpretation" that may reflect a deeper psychological or
sociological truth). Her ultimate error - interpreting the horsemen
at Twickenham as kidnappers 64 - endangers her very existence.
But other characters in the novel also misperceive reality. Hervey
misreads Arabella's disdain as "aukward Cunning'265 or "Simplic-
ity. '2 66 Likewise, Glanville misinterprets Arabella's diffidence as
snobbery,26 although by the end of the novel he is the only charac-
ter besides Lucy who can understand Arabella's expressive ges-
tures.26 Like her brother, Charlotte Glanville has interpretive
difficulties;269 her greatest failure is her belief that Sir George
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romance style.27° Significantly, the worst interpreter in the novel
is also the character most convinced of Arabella's madness, her
uncle, Sir Charles, who misjudges both Bellmour's motive for pre-
senting himself as the Prince of Kent271 and the Countess's ability
to identify with Arabella's romantic delusions.272 If Arabella has
difficulty interpreting her experience correctly, the other characters
are scarcely more successful.
Although a postmodern reader may be tempted to see the novel
as presenting Arabella's world as an alternative, equally valid
version of truth, the narrator serves clearly to enforce the claims of
conventional reality. The novel's dedication to an objectively true
reality is demonstrated by Arabella's and Charlotte's debate about
the moon. Arabella objects to Charlotte's comparing the moon to "a
Cream Cheese" by asserting that the moon is "a Planet, which,
haply, is not much less than our Earth."2 '3 Charlotte derides this
assertion, noting that the moon does not "appear broader than your
Gardener's Face. 27 4 Rejecting the idea that the moon is "not much
less than the whole World," she exclaims, "Why, certainly, I have
more Reason to trust my own Eyes, than such whimsical Notions as
these. 275  Charlotte's relativist view of reality, far from being
validated, is presented as an example of her "Ignorance. 27 6 The
novel accepts the distinction between truth and falsity; Lennox does
not celebrate her heroine as a proto-postmodernist. Nevertheless,
the other characters' misinterpretations, the essential accuracy of
many of Arabella's interpretations, and Arabella's interpretive self-
confidence destabilize the satire. As Laurie Langbauer points out,
"ridicule is not so much what the book does as what it is about....
[W]e are not so much laughing at Arabella; we are watching the
other characters laughing .... Because the characters laugh first,
the author and the readers are slightly dissociated from the
ridicule. 277 Arabella is insulated from the full force of ridicule by
the narrative's "slight dissociation" of Arabella's processes from her
conclusions. As we have seen, the narrative lingers over scenes in
which Arabella's reasoning unfolds; in contrast, Charlotte's
perfunctory "reasoning" about the size of the moon consists entirely
of her derisive comparison between her cousin's "whimsical
270. See id. at 139, 254.
271. See id. at 253-54.
272. See id. at 330.
273. Id. at 142.
274. Id. at 143.
275. Id.
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Notions" and the (mistaken) evidence of her "own Eyes."2 8
Arabella's romantic conclusions are just as incorrect as Charlotte's
astronomical ones, but Arabella earns greater respect as a reasoner.
Because the narrator gives the reader access to Arabella's mental
processes, the reader can appreciate an aspect of Arabella that the
characters cannot. The characters judge her entirely by her ridi-
culous conclusions; the reader can also judge her by her powers of
reason.
This distinction between premises and processes was an
accepted part of eighteenth-century epistemology. Locke makes
this very distinction in his definition of "mad Men":
[T]hey do not appear to me to have lost the Faculty of Reason-
ing: but having joined together some Ideas very wrongly, they
mistake them for Truths; and they err as Men do, that argue
right from wrong Principles. For by the violence of their
Imaginations, having taken their Fancies for Realities, they
make right deductions from them. 79
As Leland Warren points out, Arabella satisfies Locke's definition
of madness.28 ° Like Locke's madman, Arabella has not lost "the
Faculty of Reasoning," but makes "right deductions" from her
mistaken premises. Just as Arabella sees herself as a romance
heroine, demanding that others behave accordingly, so in Locke's
example, "a distracted Man fancying himself a King, with a right
inference require[s] suitable Attendance, Respect, and
Obedience." '281 In Locke's view, madmen reason correctly from
wrong premises, in contrast to "Naturals" or "Idiots," who "make
very few or no Propositions, and reason scarce at all." '282 No one
could claim that Arabella "reason[s] scarce at all;" her mental
deficiency lies not in her Reason, which remains very active, but in
her distorted premises.
These distorted premises result in a specific mental deficiency
that becomes a central satirical target: Arabella's legalism.
Arabella recognizes the supremacy of the "Laws of Romance, 283
with their subsidiaries, the "Laws of Gallantry and Respect ' 284 and
278. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 143.
279. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMANE UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. ix, § 13, at
161 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975) (4th ed. 1700).
280. See Warren, supra note 224, at 367.
281. LOCKE, supra note 279, bk. II, ch. ix, § 13, at 161.
282. Id.
283. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 137, 172, 297, 348.
284. Id. at 32.
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the "Laws of Decency and Decorum." '285 Her actions are always
constrained by these laws, and by the "examples" of the romance
heroines. 8 6 Because romance convention forbids the hero to make
an open declaration of love to the heroine, Arabella is offended by
Glanville's admission that he admires and loves her.28  She
overanxiously forestalls any similar declaration by potential lovers
like Hervey218 and Selvin.289 She is not afraid to enter the stran-
ger's chariot because "nothing was more common to Heroines than
such Adventures"; 9 ° she visits Glanville's sickroom, though he has
not asked for her, because several romance heroines "condescended"
to visit their lovesick heroes.29'
If Arabella's "reliance on precedents set by books parodies the
laws of probabilistic inference from past events to future,' 292 it also
subjects to scrutiny the reasoning method used in common-law
decisionmaking. Like an English judge, Arabella, whenever faced
with a difficult decision, searches for a "precedent" from the
romances to guide her actions. Realizing that her suspicion of her
uncle's designs on her is an "extravagant... Notion," she neverthe-
less feels that her suspicion is valid because she "found Precedents
in her Romances of Passions full as strange and unjustifiable. 293
Faced with Hervey's letter, Arabella "search[es] the Records of her
Memory for a Precedent, and not finding, that any Lady ever
opened a Letter from an unknown Lover, she reiterate[s] her
Commands to Lucy to carry it back .... 294
However, like a judge, Arabella is also willing to act in the
absence of precedent. She instructs Lucy how to relate her history,
although "there was no Precedent in all the Romances her Library
was stuffed with" for a maid's having to be coached. 295 When
Arabella fears that her father will force her to marry Glanville
against her wishes, she resolves "to provide for her own Security, by
a speedy Flight." '296 Although "[t]he Want of a Precedent.. . for an
Action of this Nature, held her a few Moments in Suspense," she
reasons herself out of the dilemma by noting "that there was not
285. Id. at 161.
286. See, e.g., id. at 10, 27, 45.
287. See id. at 32.
288. See id. at 11.
289. See id. at 283.
290. Id. at 100.
291. Id. at 132.
292. Depuydt, supra note 229, at 81.
293. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 164.
294. Id. at 13.
295. Id. at 122.
296. Id. at 35.
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any of the Ladies in Romances, in the same Circumstances with
herself .... 29 In modern terms, we would say that Arabella
"distinguishes" her case from the cases of the romance heroines,
freeing herself to flee her father's house on the basis of her own
"Conviction."'2 9 Of course, her father's illness pretermits her flight,
but she has proved herself the equal in method, if not in substance,
to an English judge. Indeed, Arabella's explanations for her inter-
pretations often read like modern judicial opinions, larded as they
are with citations to romance precedents.299
Although Arabella is capable of reasoning like a common-law
judge, she lacks his authority. The "pious Monitor"3 ° who attends
her after her plunge into the Thames does not view her as an
authoritative reasoner. Adopting the other characters' view of her
as silly or mad, he views his office as "the Cure of Arabella's
Mind."' ' Arabella's insistence that her dive into the river was
"reasonable and just" and "great and glorious 302 is characterized as
"Obstinacy."30 3 Yet, despite her lack of authority, Arabella skillfully
holds her own in the argument with the clergyman. When she asks,
respecting her dive into the Thames, whether she "was frighted
without Cause," he replies, "It is certain, Madam, .... that no Injury
was intended you."30 4 Arabella properly reprimands him for this
reply, noting that his answer is both nonresponsive and based on
speculation: "Human Beings cannot penetrate Intentions, nor
regulate their Conduct but by exterior Appearances.""3 Again,
when the Doctor asserts that the French romances "at once vitiate
the Mind, and pervert the Understanding; and... if they are at any
Time read with Safety, owe their Innocence only to their Absur-
dity," Arabella "entangle[s]" him by replying, 'These Books, Sir,
thus corrupt, thus absurd, thus dangerous alike to the Intellect and
Morals, I have read; and that I hope without Injury to my Judg-
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., id. at 132, 183, 280, 316, 335. Eighteenth-century judges did not use
precedent in the same systematic, thorough way as modern Anglo-American judges do. As
James Oldham explains, the incompleteness and uncertain quality of most case reports in
the eighteeth century made access to precedent difficult. See 1 OLDHAM, supra note 53, at
102-05. Nevertheless, Lord Mansfield, at least, "acknowledged the importance of precedent
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302. Id.
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ment, or my Virtue."3" The Doctor realizes too late that he cannot
make this argument without insulting Arabella.
So far, Arabella has the best of the dispute. Then, however, she
concedes that the romances are fictions and asks the clergyman,
"[W]hy, supposing them Fictions, and intended to be received as
Fictions, [do] you censure them as absurd?" ' °7 The Doctor launches
into his famous Johnsonian sermonette: "The only Excellence of
Falshood... is its Resemblance to Truth. ,,.0' The romances, he
argues, are unrealistic because "they teach young Minds to expect
strange Adventures and sudden Vicissitudes.. .'."'0 He asserts
that "[a] long Life may be passed without a single Occurrence that
can cause much Surprize, or produce any unexpected Consequence
of great Importance.... "31 0 Just as the other characters' identifica-
tion of the highwaymen was only probabilistic, so the canon's
assertion rests only on probability: a life may be lived without
Adventure. Arabella quickly presents a specific example to the
contrary: "I have found that Life is subject to many Accidents. Do
you count my late Escape for nothing?" '311 The narrator calls
Arabella's assertion an "Absurdity;"'312 the Doctor does indeed count
her experience for "nothing" because it is, in his words, "the Fact
which is at present the Subject of Dispute." '313 We recognize here
the Doctor's devaluation of Arabella's particular experience in
relation to his own abstract platitudes. Once the validity of a
woman's interpretation of her experience is made the "Subject of
Dispute," the woman's own life is deprived of any epistemological
authority.
In effect, Arabella questions, "How can you say such things
never happen when such a thing just happened to me. ' The Doctor
answers her by saying that the real question is whether she should
have interpreted her experience as an adventure. The Doctor's case
rests on the proposition that Arabella is not entitled to interpret her
life as one of Adventure; she, along with everyone else, should
"suffer [herself] to be carried alike down the Stream of Custom."3"4
Having successfully excluded from the argument the evidence
of Arabella's own experience, the Doctor abandons reason and
306. Id. at 374.
307. Id. at 378.
308. Id.
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appeals instead to authority - his own: "your Ladyship must
suffer me to decide, in some Measure authoritatively, whether Life
is truly described in those Books.... 315 The clergyman makes his
own life the measure of Truth. Submitting to the canon's authority
to define reality, Arabella still insists that the romances depict a
world superior to the real one.316 The Doctor, however, appeals to
Christian morality, and by emphasizing the "Ruin and Desolation,
Bloodshed and Misery" '317 depicted in the romances, he convinces
Arabella that they celebrate "the Crime of deliberate unnecessary
Bloodshed." '18 Earlier, Arabella's relativist reasoning about the
identity of the highwaymen silenced Glanville; here, the clergy-
man's appeal to the absolute ground of Christianity silences Ara-
bella. Conceding the argument by declaring that her "Heart yields
to the Force of Truth,"'319 Arabella implicitly acknowledges that the
values of the pagan world must yield to those of the Christian. One
system of conventions, Christian morality, proves superior to
another, the romances.
The novel does not end with Arabella's conversion, however.
Her change of heart earns her a companionate marriage, in which
she and Glanville are "united . . . in every Virtue and laudable
Affection of the Mind."32  To emphasize the happiness of this
ending for Arabella, Lennox contrasts it with Charlotte's end, in
which she and Sir George are "married in the common Acceptation
of the Word; that is, they [are] privileged to join Fortunes, Equi-
pages, Titles, and Expence." '321 Modern critics have debated what
kind of resolution Arabella's conversion and subsequent marriage
represents. The minority concur with Lennox's apparent intention
that the ending be viewed as a happy one for the heroine. Sally C.
Hoople describes the ending as "the comparatively happy conclusion
... which leaves no doubt about the value of sanity." '322 Elaine M.
Kauvar, analogizing The Female Quixote to Austen's coming-of-age
novels, characterizes the novel as "a story in which a character
progresses from a mistaken adherence to illusions to a realistic and
happy acceptance of life." '323
315. Id.
316. See id. at 380.
317. Id. at 381.
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But most critics read the ending as a defeat for Arabella, a loss
of authority and autonomy. 324 For Patricia Meyer Spacks, the con-
clusion represents Arabella's "acceptance of male wisdom, her rejec-
tion of her own imagined selfhood, her willingness to dwindle into
a wife. 325 In Deborah Ross' view, the novel teaches that "the clear-
est path to personal happiness is obedience to just authority. '326
That authority is clearly male, hegemonic, and Johnsonian. Laurie
Langbauer asserts that Arabella's conversion entails,
her complete identification with men .... At the end of the book,
Arabella is inaugurated into man's realm and becomes indistin-
guishable from the men in it. She leaves romance by participat-
ing in the patriarchal discourse of moral law, and in that
discussion loses her voice; her words become literally
undistinguishable from those of the Doctor.327
These critics lament Arabella's reconciliation to the existing order
because that order, dominated by men, necessarily involves female
subordination. In losing her romance world, Arabella loses not just
an unhealthy illusion (although it is that) but, more importantly, an
empowering alternative to the existing male order. Her brief period
of autonomy, misguided as it is, nevertheless represents a feminist
potential.
Indeed, some criticism verges on blaming Lennox personally for
the betrayal of an incipient feminist vision. Pointing to the
controversy over Johnson's alleged authorship of the chapter in
which Arabella is converted, Langbauer draws an explicit analogy
between the heroine's loss of voice and the author's:
And just as Arabella, once in [the male] world, loses her voice,
when Lennox calls on it in the penultimate chapter of The
Female Quixote, so does she. Like Arabella's voice with the
Doctor's, Lennox's blends with Dr. Johnson's, so much so that
it is impossible to know who really wrote the chapter - but
whether Dr. Johnson wrote it or whether he influenced a most
faithful pastiche is immaterial. What is important is that
Lennox herself, literally or figuratively, must disappear; power
and authority can enter her text only as a man; only a man can
dispel romance.328
324. See, e.g., KRAFT, supra note 221, at 87; Warren, supra note 224, at 378.
325. Spacks, supra note 209, at 540.
326. Ross, supra note 213, at 461.
327. Langbauer, supra note 206, at 42.
328. Id. at 42-43.
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David Marshall reads the ending as a "double renunciation:
Arabella's renunciation of romances and Lennox's apparent
abdication of female authority and authorship... in turning over
her narrative to the mastery of Dr Johnson, or at least his master-
ful voice." '329 Susan Kubica Howard likewise discerns Johnson's
influence in the resolution of the novel's plot. Comparing The
Female Quixote unfavorably with Lennox's first novel, The Life of
Harriot Stuart, Howard opines that Lennox's dependence on
Johnson's informal patronage required her to tone down her
heroine's independence, to "support a masculine vision of society
which labeled women submissive, passive, and inferior to men.
330
According to Howard, Johnson's influence "conflict[ed] with the
more revolutionary voice Lennox could offer literature."33'
This almost wistful critical longing for a more "revolutionary"
novel can be seen as a projection of late twentieth-century feminist
sensibilities onto the novel. Some critics seem unaware of this
ahistorical tendency; Deborah Ross notes that the "arena in which
women can exercise their powers ... does not yet exist - Arabella,
after all, has no career, though her author does .... Other
critics refer explicitly to the disparity between modern feminist
visions and eighteenth-century literary conventions. For example,
Catherine Craft concedes, "England in 1752 is neither the time nor
the place for herstory. 33 The (virtuous) career woman whose life
is narratable, a sort of Mary Tyler Moore figure - certainly, this
represents an alternative to both Arabella's romantic existence and
to her companionate marriage, but undoubtedly an unrealistic one,
given the conventions of eighteenth-century fiction. These critics'
eagerness to find a meaningful realm for the exercise of Arabella's
intellect, their desire to posit other ways in which Arabella could
have been given a meaningful role in society, reflect their realiza-
tion of the incommensurability between Arabella's powers and her
possibilities. Frustrated with this incommensurability, some
feminist critics wish to provide a realistic realm of existence for the
329. David Marshall, Writing Masters and "Masculine Exercises" in The Female Quixote,
5 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FICTION 105, 117 (1993).
330. Susan Kubica Howard, Introduction to CHARLOTTE LENNOX, THE LIFE OF HARRIOT
STUART, WRITTEN BY HERSELF 13, 17 (Susan Kubica Howard ed., Farleigh Dickinson
University Press 1995) (1751).
331. Id. at 286 n.21.
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heroine in which she will not be subordinated to men. In essence,
they believe that she deserves autonomy and intellectual equality,
even while they realize that this is precisely what eighteenth-
century English society, and fictional conventions, denied her.
If England in 1752 was neither the time nor the place for
herstory, for what was it the time and place? By asking this
question, by historicizing the inquiry into the referential aspects of
the quixotean satire, feminist critics can struggle more fruitfully to
understand the sociohistorical valence of this novel. The first clue,
which we have already explored, is Arabella's ridiculous but
enlightened character, the incommensurability that has stimulated
feminist criticism of the novel. The second clue is the novel's
vocabulary, Lennox's remarkable choice of terms within which to
imbricate her heroine. Lennox consistently associates Arabella
with two terms: Custom, which carries a negative connotation, and
Reason, which carries a positive connotation. The combination of
Arabella's characterization and the vocabulary with which she is
associated helps us make a connection between the novel and one
of the earliest forms of feminist discourse, the writings, of Mary
Astell and other early eighteenth-century feminists. The unmistak-
able reference Lennox makes to the discourse of these writers
provides an important context for our understanding of the
construction of Arabella and the satiric content of the novel.
IV. CUSTOM VS. REASON IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FEMINISM
A. Mary Astell and the Early Eightgenth-Century Feminists
In discussing the social position of English women at the turn
of the eighteenth century, Mary Astell and her followers invoked
the distinction between Reason and Custom. While asserting that
women's subordinate social, political, and legal position was a
product of Custom, they claimed for women equal access to the
realm of Reason.334 This claim was made possible by the advent of
Cartesian philosophy, which broke the conceptual linkage between
women's minds and their bodies by positing the mind as independ-
334. See HILDA L. SMITH, REASON'S DISCIPLES: SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH
FEMINISTS 11-12 (1982). Women's invocation of Reason in claiming equality of civil and
political rights was not limited to England. See generally GENEVItVE FRAISSE, REASONS'
MUSE: SEXUAL DIFFERENCE AND THE BIRTH OF DEMOCRACY (Jane Marie Todd trans. 1994)
(examining period 1800-1820 in France); ERICA HARTH, CARTESIAN WOMEN: VERSIONS AND
SUBVERSIONS OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE IN THE OLD REGIME (1992) (examining pre-
Revolutionary France).
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ent from the body. In classical Greece, "femaleness was symboli-
cally associated with what Reason supposedly left behind - the
dark powers of the earth goddesses, immersion in unknown forces
associated with mysterious female powers." '335 As Lorraine Code
puts it, "In the folklore of most western societies women are repre-
sented ... as incapable of having knowledge of the best and most
rational kind." '336 For example, in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century satires, authors demonstrated their inability to imagine
strong intellects in feminine bodies; they often depicted learned
women as Amazons having the same physical attributes and
engaging in the same rigorous physical training as men.337 It was
a commonplace by the eighteenth century that the wrong kind of
learning, or too much of it, would "unsex"e a female.33 Concomi-
tantly, proponents of women's intellectual inferiority asserted that
women's mental energies were naturally fixated on their bodies.
Lord Lyttleton's poem, "Advice to a Lady," addressed to "Belinda,"
powerfully illustrates the conventional view of the relationship
between women's minds and their bodies:
What is your sex's earliest, latest care,
Your heart's supreme ambition? To be fair:
For this the toilet every thought employs,
Hence all the toils of dress, and all the joys:
For this, hands, lips, and eyes are put to school,
And each instructed feature has its rule ....
Do you, my fair, endeavour to possess
An elegance of mind as well as dress;
Be that your ornament, and know to please
By graceful nature's unaffected ease.
Nor make to dangerous wit a vain pretence,
But wisely rest content with modest sense;
For wit, like wine, intoxicates the brain,
Too strong for feeble woman to sustain ....
Belinda is caught in a vicious mind-body circle in which her toilet
becomes her only school. We might distill Lord Lyttleton's conven-
tional view as follows: women's bodies weaken their minds so as to
disqualify them from attending to anything other than their own
335. LLOYD, supra note 174, at 2.
336. CODE, supra note 2, at x.
337. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 43-56.
338. See id. at 43.
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bodies. The parallel with the view of female rationality inscribed
within the legal system by the jury of matrons is clear: women -
for no other reason than their sex (i.e., the femaleness of their
bodies) - are disqualified from exercising intellectual authority
over anything other than the bodies of other women.
But Cartesian philosophy held the promise of allowing women
access to "the best and most rational" knowledge. If mind was
wholly separate from body, as asserted by Descartes, women's
minds could not be viewed as contaminated by their alleged bodily
inferiority. In the words of Frangois Poullain de la Barre in 1673,
''esprit n'a point de sexe" ('The Mind has no sex").34° By defining
Reason as "a distinctively methodical way of thinking" '341 accessible
to the human mind, Cartesian philosophy was built upon the
premise that knowledge could be acquired by "following the
'natural' processes of the mind." '42 The solitary pursuit of one's own
mental processes, Descartes believed, could lead to the discovery of
new truth because "[t]he correspondence between the basic
structures of human thought and the order of the world . . . is
divinely guaranteed." '343
Reason as a divinely ordained mental process for discovering
truth - this was the power women claimed as their passport to
equality. From Descartes, they argued "that God had created
women as human beings with rational souls which he expected to
be developed, and that men and women had equal rational
abilities." '344 In A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Mary Astell wrote,
"GOD has given Women as well as Men intelligent Souls." '345 By
linking woman's intellect with her soul, and by giving both the
same unimpeachable Creator, Astell boldly assumed what had only
been argued earlier by Quakers and other non-Conformist writers:
the spiritual equality of women.346 For Astell, in Rosemary Radford
Reuther's words, "[h]uman reason is a spark of the divine
Reason." '347
340. SCHIEBINGER, supra note 16, at 1.
341. LLOYD, supra note 174, at 39.
342. Id. at 43.
343. Id. at 42.
344. SMITH, supra note 334, at 12. For a concise summary of the difficulties that
Cartesianism posed for women's claims to intellectual equality, see NANCY TUANA, THE LESS
NOBLE SEX: SCIENTIFIC, RELIGIOUS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF WOMAN'S NATURE
60-64 (1993).
345. MARY ASTELL, A SERIOUS PROPOSAL TO THE LADIES. PARTS I AND II, at 18 (Source
Book Press 1970) (4th ed. 1701).
346. See Rosemary Radford Reuther, Prophets and Humanists: Types of Religious
Feminism in Stuart England, 70 J. RELIGION 1 (1990).
347. Id. at 15.
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Astell was also prepared to meet her opponents' counterargu-
ment: If women are equal to men in rationality, why had they not
excelled equally in intellectual pursuits? The feminists' answer to
this question was 'Tyrant Custom. 3 48 It was Custom that denied
women access to the political sphere, denied them equal legal
rights, and most of all, denied them a useful and truly intellectual
education that would have equipped them to participate in the legal
and political systems. As conceived by Astell, Custom was not an
entity, but a force, "that merciless torrent that carries all before
it." '349 Despite the power of Custom, Astell noted, its dictates are
not necessarily right: 'That the Custom of the World has put
Women, generally speaking, into a State of Subjection, is not
denied; but the Right can no more be prov'd from the Fact, than the
Predominacy of Vice can justify it."35 For Astell, "Human Actions
are no otherwise valuable, than as they are conformable to Reason
"... Astell and her followers associated Reason with divinely
ordained nature, Custom with man-made culture. For the early
eighteenth-century feminists, the tyranny of Custom was most
noticeable and most deleterious to women in the area of education.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, women were
excluded from the universities, while enrollment of men increased
rapidly. 52 Thus, women were denied the study of the classics,
which were "accepted as the essential reading not only of scholars,
but also of gentlemen." '353 This exclusion was justified on the
grounds that women were "deficient in natural powers," that their
"immoral inclinations" would be encouraged by the pagan writers,
and that a classical education would be useless to them since their
proper sphere was "the kitchen, sickroom and nursery."'354 It is
impossible to generalize across class lines about the education
women did receive; however, it seems clear that most women's
education in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, depending
on their social class, consisted of some combination of basic reading
and writing, household skills, handicrafts, and "accomplishments"
348. ASTELL, supra note 345, at 11.
349. Id. at 10.
350. MARY ASTELL, SOME REFLECTIONS UPON MARRIAGE 99 (Source Book Press 1970) (4th
ed. 1730).
351. Id. at 83.
352. See SMITH, supra note 334, at 21-22.
353. PATRICIA PHILLIPS, THE SCIENTIFIC LADY: A SocIAL HISTORY OF WOMEN'S SCIENTIFIC
INTERESTS 1520-1918, at 3 (1990).
354. Id. at 12. This congeries of reasons for the exclusion of women from higher education
embraces both the "inferior intellect" and the "separate spheres" theories.
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like fancy needlework, music, dancing, and modern languages. 355
The early eighteenth-century feminists saw clearly the relationship
between Reason and the Custom that allowed only men access to a
substantial education: "Sense is a Portion that GOD Himself has
been pleased to distribute to both Sexes with an impartial Hand,
but Learning is what Men have engross'd to themselves... ."356
In her poem, "The Emulation," Sarah Fyge Egerton summa-
rized the relationship between male-maintained Custom and
women's education:
Say Tyrant Custom, why must we obey,
The impositions of thy haughty Sway;
From the first dawn of Life, unto the Grave,
Poor Womankind's in every State, a Slave.
They fear we should excel their sluggish Parts,
Should we attempt the Sciences and Arts.
Pretend they were design'd for them alone,
So Keep us Fools to raise their own Renown;
And shall we women now sit tamely by,
Make no excursions in philosophy,
Or grace our thoughts in tuneful poetry?
We will our Rights in Learning's World maintain,
Wits Empire, now, shall know a Female Reign .... 357
Egerton's use of the future tense emphasizes that this fruition of
Cartesian philosophy - women's "Reign" in 'Wits Empire" - has
not yet been realized. Her vision of the learned women of the future
is obscured by the specter of the foolish women of the present.
The specter of foolish women resulted, however, only because
men's superior education skewed the available evidence about
men's and women's respective intellectual abilities. The early
eighteenth-century feminists argued that women's intellectual
existence, as fettered by Custom, could not serve as valid evidence
of their intellectual potential, once their Reason was liberated. In
their view, the social convention that limited women's educational
opportunities had stunted women's natural rational capacities. As
355. See SMITH, supra note 334, at 23.
356. ASTELL, supra note 350, at 111.
357. Sarah Fyge Egerton, The Emulation, lines 1-4, 19-22, 32-33 (1703), reprinted in THE
"OTHER" EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: ENGLISH WOMEN OF LETTERS 1660-1800, at 141-42 (Robert
W. Uphaus & Gretchen M. Foster eds., 1991) [hereinafter THE "OTHER" EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY].
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Judith Drake wrote in 1696, "For a Man ought no more to value
himself upon being Wiser than a Woman, if he owe his Advantage
to a better Education, and greater means of Information, than he
ought to boast of his Courage, for beating a Man, when his Hands
were bound." '358 Mary Astell argued that since "Boys have much
Time and Pains, Care and Cost bestow'd on their Education, [while]
Girls have little or none," it is fundamentally unfair to assert "that
Mens Understandings are superior to Womens, for, after many
Years Study and Experience, they become wise and learned, and
Women are not Born so!"
3 59
Like Egerton, who admitted on behalf of all women that men
"Keep us Fools,'3 6° Astell did not attempt to deny her opponents'
portrayal of women; in society as it exists, she admitted, women
may indeed appear ridiculous:
There is a sort of Learning indeed which is worse than the
greatest Ignorance: A Woman may study Plays and Romances
all her days, and be a great deal more knowing but never a jot
the wiser. Such a knowledge as this serves only to instruct and
put her forward in the practice of the greatest Follies, yet how
can they justly blame her who forbid, or at least won't afford
opportunity of better? A rational mind will be employ'd, it will
never be satisfy'd in doing nothing, and if you neglect to furnish
it with good materials, 'tis like to take up with such as come to
hand.36'
As depicted by Astell, women are reasoning machines that must be
provided with proper fuel, or starving scavengers who, forbidden
higher forms of sustenance, satisfy their ravenous intellectual
appetites with less nutritious fare. Women should read "good ma-
terials," which Astell explicitly contrasts with "Plays and Ro-
mances." For Astell, the romances that "instruct" women in "the
greatest Follies" do not represent a desirable feminist alternative
to the masculine world. Women read romances, not because they
long for a world of female power and significance, but only because
romances are often the only available materials with which to
employ their ever-active minds. Clearly, for Astell, Woman as she
is, nourished on "Plays and Romances," is inferior to Woman as she
should be, exercising her intellect on "good materials."
358. JUDITH DRAKE, AN ESSAY IN DEFENCE OF THE FEMALE SEX (1696), excerpted in THE
"OTHER" EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, supra note 357, at 23, 30.
359. ASTELL, supra note 350, at 122-23.
360. Egerton, supra note 357, at 141.
361. ASTELL, supra note 345, at 19-20.
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The warning Astell issues in this passage - "if you neglect to
furnish it with good materials" '62 - seems directed at men.
Throughout the early feminists' writings, women are depicted as
largely the product of men. Men are the agents who have produced
women's subordinate intellectual existence. The agency of men and
the passivity of women are figured powerfully in the following
passage, in which Astell uses a horticultural metaphor with Biblical
echoes.63 to describe the causal relationship between Man's control
of education and Woman's lack of intellectual achievement:
The Soil is rich and would if well cultivated produce a noble
Harvest[;] if then the Unskilful Managers, not only permit, but
incourage noxious Weeds, tho' we shall suffer by the Neglect,
yet they ought not in justice to blame any but themselves, if
they reap the Fruit of this their foolish Conduct. Women are
from their very Infancy debar'd those Advantages, with the
want of which they are afterwards reproached, and nursed up
in those Vices which will hereafter be upbraided to them. So
partial are Men as to expect Brick where they afford no Straw;
and so abundantly civil as to take care we shou'd make good
that obliging Epithet of Ignorant, which out of an excess of good
Manners, they are pleas'd to bestow on us!.64
Woman as she is, Astell associates with man-made culture; Woman
as she should be, she associates with Nature, the "rich Soil" that,
properly cultivated (and Astell's image benefits from the connota-
tions of this word) would yield a "noble Harvest." To post-Freudian
readers, the image of men as farmers tilling the fertile soil of
women's minds resonates with psychosexual overtones. Astell's
immediate point is more practical, however. She seeks to deprive
her opponents of an important piece of evidence: the lack of
intellectual achievement by the generality of women in her time.
Instead, she argues, women's alleged intellectual inferiority
constitutes a male-initiated and male-maintained "vicious circle."36
Men deny women the benefits of a substantive education, relegate
362. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
363. This metaphor was not original with Astell; indeed, by the eighteenth century it had
become somewhat conventional. For example, in 1675, Hannah Woolley wrote: '"[H]ad we
the same Literature, [men] would find our brains as fruitful as our bodies .... I cannot but
complain of, and must condemn the great negligence of Parents, in letting the fertile ground
of their Daughters lie fallow, yet. send the barren Noddles of their sons to the
University ... ' ADA WALLAS, BEFORE THE BLUESTOCKINGS 45 (1929) (quoting HANNAH
WOOLLEY, THE GENTLEWOMAN'S COMPANION 2 (1675)).
364. ASTELL, supra note 345, at 6.
365. SMITH, supra note 334, at 125.
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them to reading 'Plays and Romances," then unfairly use the scanty
harvest of their minds as evidence of the barrenness of their
intellects.
In opposing Custom to Reason, Astell and her followers made
a bold analytical and rhetorical move. By associating Reason with
the divinely ordained natural order, they could argue that if women,
like men, have souls, then they also share equally with men in
Reason. This strategy implicitly condemned, on the ground of
religion, anything that interfered with the exercise of Reason. By
identifying the chief impediment to Reason as Custom - man-made
social convention - the feminists assigned the responsibility for
women's stunted intellectual growth to men, opened up a realm of
intellectual potential for women, and argued that women's position
could be ameliorated through remedial changes in society, chiefly
the provision of a better education for women.
Male intellectuals in the eighteenth century may have used the
terms "Reason" and "Custom" in imprecise and confused ways.366
But Astell and her colleagues, perhaps with the clarity of vision
born of oppression, knew precisely what the words meant. Reason
was a divine gift to all human beings regardless of sex, and Custom
was a man-made system of rules that inhibited the exercise of that
gift. With respect to women, Custom represented what was, and
Reason stood for what should be.
B. From Astell to Sophia: Mid-Eighteenth-Century Feminists
The representation of Woman deployed by the early eighteenth-
century feminists provided a useful model for the quixotean figure
of Arabella because this representation embodied characteristics
that were both ridiculed and applauded. Although there is no direct
evidence that Lennox knew the works of the early eighteenth-
century feminists,367 her novel originated within a culture in which
the particular convention was accepted and recognized. The
opposition of Custom to Reason predates Astell's feminist deploy-
ment of the dichotomy. Writers far better known than the early
366. See James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and
Reason?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1321 (1991).
367. However, there is a tantalizing bit of evidence that Lennox might have known the
Sophia pamphlets. See infra text accompanying note 392. In the second of her pamphlets,
among the characters that Sophia pillories are Tinsel, a young fop newly returned from his
travels, and Grand Seigneur Selvin, whose betrothed commits suicide rather than marry
him. See BEAuTY's TRIUMPH: OR, THE SUPERIORITY OF THE FAIR SEX INVINCIBLY PROVED 284
(1751) [hereinafter BEAUTY'S TRIUMPH]. In the novel, Tinsel and Selvin are the names of the
two pompous men whom Arabella meets at Bath. See LENNOX, supra note 200, at 281.
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eighteenth-century feminists used it. John Locke opposed Custom
to Reason in Some Thoughts on Education, one of the most popular
works on education throughout the century. Commenting on the
assertion that memorization is an effective pedagogical method,
Locke notes, "I could wish this were said with as much Authority of
Reason, as it is with forwardness of Assurance, and that this
practice were established upon good Observation, more than old
Custom."3" Explaining the purpose of his treatise, Locke says, with
a touch of sarcasm, that it is intended for "those, whose Concern for
their dear little Ones makes them so irregularly bold, that they
dare venture to consult their own Reason, in the Education of their
Children, rather than wholly to rely upon Old Custom." '369 Custom
- specifically, "old Custom" - denotes a conservative, traditional
force that impedes more progressive, more natural pedagogy. Here,
as in Astell, Reason is the positive pole; Custom, the negative.
Another popular writer who drew upon the dichotomy was
Lady Mary Wortley Montagu. In a 1710 letter to Bishop Burnet
accompanying her translation, from a Latin version, of Epictetus'
Enchiridion, she lamented the state of women's education:
We are permitted no Books but such as tend to the weakening
and Effeminateing the Mind ... and tis look'd upon as in a
degree Criminal to improve our Reason, or fancy we have any.
We are taught to place all our Art in adorning our Outward
Forms, and permitted, without reproach, to carry that Custom
even to Extravagancy, while our Minds are entirely neglected
370
In another passage, she describes Custom as "the common road,"
complaining about the very "stream of Custom" that Lennox has her
good Doctor propose as the alternative to Arabella's life of adven-
ture: 'This Custom, so long establish'd and industriously upheld,
makes it even ridiculous to go out of the common road, and forces
one to find as manny Excuses, as if it was a thing altogether
criminal not to play the fool in Consort with other Women of
Quality .... 071 Here, typically distinguishing herself from other
women, Montagu acknowledges that bucking Custom by studying
368. JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION 232 (John W. Yolton & Jean
S. Yolton eds., 1989).
369. Id. at 265.
370. Letter from Lady Mary Pierrepont [Montagu] to Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury
(July 20, 1710), in 1 THE COMPLETE LETTERS OF LADY MARY WORTLEY MONTAGU 43, 44-45
(Robert Halsband ed., 1965).
371. Id. at 45.
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Latin may make her seem ridiculous. The implication of the letter
is clear: by rejecting studies that would "Effeminate" her mind,
Montagu, unlike other women who "play the fool," has chosen to
improve her Reason by breaking the yoke of Custom and breaking
into the masculine preserve of Latin. Although she is careful to
disavow any advocacy of "an Equality for the 2 Sexes," '72 her
invocation of Custom and Reason parallels Astell's.
The question remains, however, whether the feminist reading
of the Custom/Reason dichotomy was available to Lennox at mid-
century. To the casual observer it might appear that eighteenth-
century feminism inscribes an arc from Mary Astell at the begin-
ning of the century to Mary Wollstonecraft at its end. Hilda Smith
asserts that Astell and her colleagues "did not have ... a direct
influence on feminist writings in the future .... This turn-of-the-
century feminism was to fade when faced with eighteenth century
values that embraced sentimentality and feeling rather than
reason."373 According to Ruth Perry, "Mary Astell's fame as a writer
dissipated very quickly after her death in 1731. '87 Similarly, Sarah
Fyge Egerton "was forgotten after her death in 1723.0 '' The work
of the early eighteenth-century feminists was apparently unknown
to the "Bluestockings," the group of female intellectuals who
flourished at mid-century, including Elizabeth Carter, Elizabeth
Montagu, and Hester Mulso.1 76 In Jane Spencer's words, "[T]he
tradition of feminist polemic was, on the whole, submerged during
the eighteenth century.3 7 Submerged, perhaps, when viewed in
relation to the towering pillars of Mary Astell and Mary Wollstone-
craft, but not invisible. A close examination of the half century that
intervened between Astell's writing and the publication of The
Female Quixote discloses a lively debate about women's rights, a
debate that engaged the two issues that most concerned Lennox:
the nature of a woman's intellect and her right to a learned
education. In the first two decades of the century, two works
appeared that supported the intellectual equality of women. The
Athenian Oracle (1703-04) consisted of excerpts from the 580
numbers of John Dunton's magazine, The Athenian Mercury (17
March 1690/91-14 June 1697). In A.R. Humphreys' view, the
372. Id.
373. SMITH, supra note 334, at 15.
374. SYLVIA HARCSTARK MYERS, THE BLUESTOCKING CIRCLE: WOMEN, FRIENDSHIP, AND
THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 122 (1990).
375. Id. at 121.
376. See id. at 122-29.




excerpts reflected a "notably progressive" view of women, admitting
that "[w]omen have 'the same principle of reason with men."'378 In
1714, Richard Steele made his contribution to women's education
with The Ladies Library, an anthology of selections from earlier
works. Although the excerpts chosen by Steele do not reflect the
reforming spirit of Astell, they do "assumeo the capability of
woman's mind, the dignity of her personality, and the desirability
of giving her morals a rational basis. 379
In The Gentleman's Magazine, "the most popular, most widely
read, and most successful eighteenth-century journal,"38 whose
first number appeared in 1731, "three out of every four writers who
touched on the woman question bemoaned the plight of women, and
suggested concrete reform measures."38' As for whether the sexes
have equal capacities, Jean Hunter found that The Gentleman's
Magazine "almost always answered this question in the affirma-
tive." '82 Among other feminist themes that figured prominently in
the magazine, the "lack of educational opportunities" for women
was the most pervasive.383 In an article in the October 1735
issue,"' he Female Sex not the Weakest," a female writer,
Climene, echoed Mary Astell's assessment of the inequality of
educational opportunities:
I know not by what barbarous Policy we were first debarred the
Improvements of our Mind by study, and our time employ'd
about Trifles, while your Sex has all the Advantages of this
Kind .... Had we the same Pains and Cares taken of us, we
should find, I fancy, more excellent Philosophers among the
Women than among the Men.385
In addition to popular periodicals, the first half of the eighteenth
century saw the publication of several feminist pamphlets. In 1721
appeared Woman Triumphant: or, the Excellency of the Female Sex;
378. A.R. Humphreys, The "Rights of Woman" in the Age of Reason, 41 MOD. LANGUAGE
REV. 256, 258 (1946).
379. Rae Blanchard, Richard Steele and the Status of Women, 26 STUD. IN PHILOLOGY 325,
342 (1929).
380. Jean E. Hunter, The 18th-Century Englishwoman: According to the Gentleman's
Magazine, in WOMAN IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND OTHER ESSAYS 73, 87 (Paul Fritz &
Richard Morton eds., 1976).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 85.
383. Id. at 81.
384. See MYERS, supra note 374, at 125.
385. Hunter, supra note 380, at 86.
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asserted in opposition to the Male, written by "A Lady of Quality. 38 6
This author argued that "[g]irls must be permitted the same
opportunities as boys even to the level of university education,'3 7
and in an appended poem reminiscent of Egerton's 'The Emula-
tion," she writes:
So let our Sex be unto 'Learning' bred,
Like you in Liberal Sciences be read;
In one short Age the Press from our keen Wit,
Should out-shine All that Men have ever Writ,
As Woman now so Men should truckle then,
Beneath the Lashes of each Female Pen.388
Men, too, advocated equal educational opportunity for women. In
Dodsley's Collection of Poems by Several Hands (London 1748),
Thomas Seward addressed a poem to Miss Pratt, later Lady
Camden, '"The Female Right to Literature, in a Letter to a Young
Lady, from Florence." '389 In the poem Seward advises Miss Pratt to
continue her studies, but admits that his advice is unconventional.
He reviews the treatment of women in countries around the world,
finally focusing on England:
But say, Britannia, do thy sons, who claim
A birth-right liberty, dispense the same
In equal scales? Why then does Custom bind
In chains of ignorance the female mind?3"
It is interesting that a male poet, rather than addressing his fellow
men (the "you" of poems by women), feels authoritative enough to
address his nation ("Britannia") and to question its treatment of
women. Of course, the address to Britain also allows him to use the
third person to ask why "thy sons" (rather than "we," i.e., men) do
not dispense liberty in equal measure to women. Seward recognizes
that women's minds are bound in chains of ignorance, suggesting,
like Astell, that women as they are do not accurately reflect women
as they could be. Like Astell, Seward also identifies the culprit as
386. PHILLIPS, supra note 353, at 67.
387. Id. at 68.
388. Id.
389. MYERS, supra note 374, at 126 (quoting Thomas Seward, The Female Right to
Literature, in a Letter to a Young Lady, from Florence, in A COLLECTION OF POEMS BY
SEVERAL HANDS 295-302 (London, R. Dodsley 1748)).
390. MYERS, supra note 374, at 127.
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"Custom," implicitly rejecting any theory of women's natural
inferiority.
The most important mid-century feminist work, the so-called
"Sophia pamphlets," appeared in 1739. The first pamphlet, by
"Sophia," was entitled Woman Not Inferior to Man and was based
upon the progressive Poulain de la Barre's L'Egalitj des Deux Sexes
(1673; English translation 1677). This pamphlet was answered by
"A Gentleman" in Man Superior to Woman, and Sophia replied in
Women's Superior Excellence Over Man. The three pamphlets were
reprinted in one volume, Beauty's Triumph; or, the Superiority of
the Fair Sex Invincibly Proved, in 1751.391 According to Ruth Perry,
these pamphlets were "much discussed" when they appeared and
were "very influential." '392 Although the Sophia pamphlets were
published after Astell's influence had allegedly waned, Sophia's
arguments precisely parallel Astell's. Sophia asserts that men and
women are born with equal shares of Reason. She argues that
through their own jealousy and fear of women, men have erected
barriers to women's use of their Reason, primarily in the form of.
educational disadvantages that they defend on the basis of Custom.
Noting the same vicious circle that Astell lamented, Sophia argues
that men use women's apparent intellectual inferiority, which
derives solely from their poor education, to justify their exclusion
from the professions and public offices; then, in turn, men use
women's exclusion from these roles to justify denying them an equal
education. In fact, on this last point, Sophia is much more radical
than Astell. Astell disavowed any advocacy of sexual equality in the
professions, asserting that "Women have no business with the
Pulpit, the Bar or St. Stephens Chapel... .""' Sophia, on the other
hand, advocates women's entry into every realm of public and
professional life other than the ministry, which she finds debarred
to women by divine fiat.39 4
391. See BEAUTY'S TRIUMPH, supra note 367. One source identifies the reprinted version
of the Sophia pamphlets as FEMALE RIGHTS VINDICATED: OR, THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES
MORALLY AND PHYSICALLY PROVED, printed in London in 1751. Ruth Perry, Introduction to
GEORGE BALLARD, MEMOIRS OF SEVERAL LADIES OF GREAT BRITAIN 34-35 (Ruth Perry ed.,
1985) (1752). Alice Browne, however, identifies it as BEAUTY'S TRIUMPH: OR, THE
SUPERIORITY OF THE FAIR SEX INVINCIBLY PROVED, which was also printed in London in 1751.
Browne explains that "Female Rights Vindicated uses some material from Sophia." ALICE
BROWNE, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FEMINIST MIND 202 n. (1987). I have seen both Female
Rights Vindicated and Beauty's Triumph, and it is clear that Beauty's Triumph constitutes
the reprint of the Sophia pamphlets. All quotations from the Sophia pamphlets throughout
this Article are taken from Beauty's Triumph.
392. Perry, supra note 391, at 35.
393. ASTELL, supra note 345, at 123.
394. See BEAUTY'S TRIUMPH, supra note 367, at 50.
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As might be expected, the discourse of Reason and Custom
pervades Beauty's Triumph. Sophia accuses men of "prostituting
reason to their groveling passions, suffering sense to be led away
captive by prejudice, and sacrificing justice, truth, and honour to
inconsiderate custom."39 She also refers to philosophers' "[i]gnor-
ance, dignified with the prerogative of custom, and supported by the
seemings of reason."'396 Lamenting the power of Custom, she claims:
[S]uch is the prevalence, which custom.., has over the minds
of the Men, that it requires much less difficulty to wean them
from sentiments, which they themselves have built on the most
convincing evidences of reason and truth, than to draw them
from the prejudices which custom has instill'd into them.397
Continuing this theme, Sophia alleges that men have been "hood-
wink'd by custom.""3  Because of Custom they are unable to
envision women filling the offices of general, judge, or professor:
"[S]o weak are their intellectuals, and so untuned are their organs
to the voice of reason, that custom makes more absolute slaves of
their senses than they can make of us." '399
Sophia challenges men to prove that their "monopoly" on the
"advantages of education and learning" is "grounded on reason,''400
condemning them for maintaining the circularity that Astell noted
half a century earlier: "Their cowardice then in excluding us from
the sciences is nothing inferior to their insolence in upbraiding us
with the want of them. They first make laws and customs to
deprive us of learning, and then blame us for ignorance. ''4°1 For
Sophia, as for the early eighteenth-century feminists, Custom
becomes a juggernaut, carrying all before it. She refers to it as
"custom, ever prevailing custom. ' 4 2 She proclaims that men's
usurpation of women's original right to equality has been "hardened
by custom into tyranny."40 3 Most poignantly, she recalls that
women who have excelled in learning had first to "renounc[e] the
395. Id. at 3.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 6.
398. Id. at 219.
399. Id. at 37.
400. Id. at 182.
401. Id. at 271.
402. Id. at 4.
403. Id. at 175.
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pleasure and indolence to which cruel custom seem'd to condemn
them."404
Predictably, in response, the author of Man Superior to Woman
refutes each of Sophia's points. Most fundamentally, he cites the
creation story in the second chapter of Genesis to argue that women
do not share equally with men in Reason. Referring to women's
being crafted from Adam's rib as their "semi-creation,"4 5 he calls
women "mere half-creatures."4 6 Given this view of women's origin,
it is not surprising that the author argues women's deficiency in
Reason. He refers to "the little glimmering of reason, which heaven
bestowed on them out of compassion to us."40 7 The most he will
allow is that "there are Women . . .who can try to reason; and
almost succeed in it."4 Promising that his argument will not be
difficult, in deference to "the weakness of their [women's] intellects,
which seldom can reach higher than a head-dress," the author
pledges, "I shall do my utmost to make Reason stoop to their
comprehension, by confining myself entirely to their sphere. 40 9
In addition to arguing that women's subordination is justified
by their defective creation and deficient Reason, the author also
argues that Custom serves as justification for women's subordina-
tion because, in this respect, Custom is based upon Reason. To sup-
port his argument, the author adduces two pieces of evidence: the
universality of women's subordination, and women's consent to it:
For it cannot without rashness be doubted, but that mankind
being rational creatures, and therefore not only directed, but
even of themselves inclined, to do nothing without reason, they
must have consulted reason for the introduction of such
practices as have been universally received by both sexes, in all
places, and at all times....
... [S]ince both sexes from the creation unanimously estab-
lished this practice, and handed it down thro' all ages to our
own, it is the height of temerity to impute the power of the Men
404. Id. at 44.
405. Id. at 103.
406. Id. at 94. This link between women's subordination and the account of Creation in
the second chapter of Genesis represented a well-recognized position in early Christian
philosophy. See generally TUANA, supra note 344, at 3-12, 56-57.
407. BEAUTY'S TRIUMPH, supra note 367, at 74.
408. Id. at 115.
409. Id. at 80.
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over the Women to inconsiderate custom or to any cause inferior
to reason and prudence.410
Thus, Sophia's adversary throws her argument into bright relief by
contesting it on the most fundamental grounds: the nature of
woman's very creation, the equality of her capacity for Reason, and
the role of man-made Custom in creating and maintaining women's
subordination.
In response, Sophia refutes her adversary's fundamental
position, that women's subordination is both divinely authorized
and based upon nature and Reason.41' She ridicules his argument
from Genesis by proposing an alternative reading:
Man being form'd a mere rough draught of that finish'd creature
Woman, GOD snatch'd from the lumpish thing the few graces
and perfections he found in it, to add them to the many he
design'd to enrich her with. And if he did entail upon her a rib
of that stupified mortal, it was out of pure pity to him, that
Woman bias'd by the sympathetic tye might with less repug-
nance stoop her exalted Soul to some regard for him.41
With respect to the positive laws that underlie and reinforce
women's subordination, Sophia points out that men "foolishly
conclude that nature had a hand in the framing those laws which
exclude us from power, dignities, and public offices." '413 She argues,
however, nature could not have "impower'd the Men to make such
laws without consulting the Women! The law-givers were Men
themselves; and therefore no wonder they should favour their own
sex. '414 Thus, through examining the literally man-made origin of
secular law regarding women, Sophia once again places those laws
in the realm of Custom rather than Reason: "Dependence in itself
is a mere civil restraint introduced by chance, force, or custom, and
ought rationally to affect none but children ....
Interestingly, given her recognition that lawmaking has been
the exclusive province of men, throughout her two treatises, Sophia
uses legal metaphors to describe her endeavor. In the first part of
her work, she likens her effort to a trial of the question whether
410. Id. at 84-85.
411. See id. at 184-89.
412. Id. at 187.
413. Id. at 219-20.




"Men are really superior to Women, and [whether] the dependence
we now are in is the very state which nature pointed out for us."4 6
In the first extended metaphor, Sophia, placing herself in the role
of women's advocate, declares that her only witness will be the
"unquestionably impartial" one of "plain undisguised truth.41 7
Having settled the matter of witnesses, she faces the most difficult
question: "But who shall the matter be tried by?" '418 Recognizing
that both women and men "are too nearly concern'd in the decision,
to be admitted even as witnesses in the trial, much less as judges
of the cause," '419 she appeals to the very quality that she is claiming
for women. The only "impartial judge," she concludes, is "rectified
reason," a "pure intellectual faculty, elevated above the consider-
ation of any sex. 42° Finally, and most radically, she asks, "But
what if we obtain a decree in our favour, upon impartial examina-
tion?"42' In that case, she declares, "all the authority, which the
Men have exerted over us hitherto, will appear an unjust usurpa-
tion on their side; for which nothing can make a tolerable atone-
ment, but their restoring us to the state of equality nature first
placed us in." '422
It is ironic, of course, that the judge itself (Reason) cannot be
counted on to execute the decree; instead, any decree for Woman
must be carried out by the very offender, Man. Somehow, Sophia
is arguing, men, when convicted of their error by Reason, will
recognize Custom as an "unjust usurpation" and will conform their
behavior to nature by "restoring" women to equality. The radical
suggestion that women should be restored to equality is diluted by
the implicit recognition that only men themselves have the power
to change the status of women, and the hopelessly optimistic
prediction that they will do so.
By establishing this legal metaphor early in her work, Sophia
demonstrates her access to legal discourse and claims for herself
the authority of a male participant in the English legal system. But
she also places her faith in a male-created, male-maintained system
for determining truth, seeming to align that system with the
exalted realm of Reason rather than the debased realm of Custom.
In the second of her treatises, she employs, not a procedural legal
416. Id. at 6.
417. Id. at 7.
418. Id.
419. Id.
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metaphor, the trial, but a substantive one, title by prescription, in
refuting her adversary's argument that women, as they are, prove
that women cannot be equal to men. First, addressing the male
author's invocation of Aristotle, she notes, "When this philosopher
says then that Women are unfit and want judgment to govern...
he must mean it only of Women, consider'd in their then and now
present circumstance of ineducation. '4 3 Later she elaborates on the
nature and implications of women's "present circumstance of
ineducation":
[S]uch is the unjust partiality of the Men to the blockheads of
their own, that all the advantages of education are wholly
reserved for them. The greatest care is taken to form and
improve their minds; and the poor Women areleft to loiter away
life in indolence and ignorance .... 424
Having established the contrast between men's and women's
education, Sophia concludes, "'tis a greater wonder that there ever
should have been one learned Woman, than it would have been had
all the Men been so, if we do but consider the inequality of educa-
tion given to the two sexes." '425 She then addresses the significance
of the long duration of women's subordination and the propriety of
seeking to overthrow the established order:
It has been deem'd necessary for the security of contracts
and the peace of families, that such as with a good conscience
have been in a long and immemorable possession of the goods
of fortune should not be liable to the disturbance of afterclaims.
But it never was heard of that a person, who, by ignorance,
neglect, or the surprise of others, has fallen from his just right,
may not try all lawful means to recover his property; and his
incapacity of possession was never consider'd as natural but
only civil.426
Several points are noteworthy here. First is the hint, embodied in
the phrase "such as with a good conscience," that men may not be
qualified to defend their "immemorable possession" of education,
the professions, and public office; they may not be able to establish
that they have engrossed these things to themselves "with a good
conscience." Sophia analogizes worldly opportunity and intellectual
423. Id. at 234.
424. Id. at 253.
425. Id. at 268.
426. Id. at 269-70.
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capacity, as improved by education, to "goods of fortune," underlin-
ing her insistence that women's present state of ineducation is the
product of culture, not nature. Paralleling her earlier assertion
that men will be forced to "restore" women to their natural state,
she analogizes women to the person who originally had possession
of property but, through no fault of his own, "has fallen from his
just right." Thus, Sophia transforms the concept of the "fall":
instead of bringing about the Fall from a state of grace to a state of
sin, women have suffered a fall from rightful possession of intellec-
tual equality and its concomitant opportunities to unlawful
exclusion from the means of maintaining that equality. The post-
fall state of woman is only "civil," that is, man-made, not "natural,"
decreed by God. Natural states are immutable; civil states are
remediable. Because women's state of dispossession is merely civil,
they can try "all lawful means to recover" their original status of
equality.
One problem with Sophia's analogy here is that restoration of
the original owner requires ouster of the usurper. Under this
analogy, for women to recover their property means that men will
lose theirs. Another problem is that, in the law, long possession
may indeed trump original right. That is, even when the dispos-
sessed person can show an original right to the property and ouster
through no fault of her own, the law may choose to promote the
policy of settled title over the policy of restoration of rights.427
Therefore, Sophia shifts the argument slightly to contrast intellec-
tual equality with earthly property:
As the same goods of fortune cannot at once be possest by
different persons, it is reasonable to maintain the actual
possessors of them with a good conscience in possession of them,
to the prejudice of very ancient proprietors. But it fares not
thus with the goods of the mind: against them there can be no
prescription; but however long we have been excluded from
them, our right of Replevin continues inalienable. Every
rational being has a right to good sense, and all that is intelligi-
ble. Reason is absolutely unlimited in her jurisdiction over
mankind; we are all born to judge of what concerns and affects
us, and if some cannot use the objects of sense with the same
facility as others, all have an equal right to them .... Knowl-
427. The modern doctrine of title by adverse possession is based upon this principle of
protecting the possessor at the expense of the owner. See generally 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 56, at 40-42. This doctrine was recognized in England from an early date; in early
modern England, the doctrine was embodied in the Statute of James, 1623, Jam., ch. 16
(Eng.), which established a twenty-year adverse possession period.
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edge and truth then are goods exempted from any prescription,
and consequently so are the sciences by which they are to be
attain'd! So that such of our sex as have been deprived of them
hitherto have a right of re-entry without any injury to those
Men who are in possession of them.428
With this analysis, Sophia solves both of the problems with her
legal metaphor. First, by asserting that "against [the goods of the
mind] there can be no prescription," she refutes any argument that
men's long possession of intellectual opportunities should trump
women's original, but long dormant, claim to them. Women, Sophia
asserts, have an "inalienable" right of "Replevin." Of course, the
reference to "inalienable" rights reminds post-Jeffersonian readers
of the Lockean discourse of the American Declaration of Independ-
ence.429 When a right is inalienable, it cannot be given up, even if
the possessor wishes to relinquish it. Sophia is saying that, no
matter how women of the past or present acted with respect to their
right to intellectual equality, no matter how much they may have
acquiesced, or may still acquiesce, in its exclusive exercise by men,
they did not and do not have the power to alienate, to give away,
this right. Women have never relinquished their right to recover
their natural status of equality.
Most interesting here, however, is Sophia's assertion that
women have a "right of Replevin," for replevin was a very special-
ized type of legal action. It was a remedy for "[tihe wrongful taking
of goods."43 Replevin was a specialized action because the plaintiff
received, not the monetary value of the goods wrongfully taken, but
the actual restitution of the goods themselves.431 Furthermore,
according to Blackstone, replevin was available "only in one
instance of an unlawful taking, that of a wrongful distress.."432 A
distress, in turn, was a self-help remedy employed by a person who
believed himself wronged; it consisted of the wronged party's
unilateral seizure of some of the wrongdoer's goods.433 The most
common example of distress was a landlord's seizure of his tenant's
428. BEAUTY'S TRIUMPH, supra note 367, at 270-71.
429. '"E hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776) (emphasis added).
430. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *145.
431. See id.
432. Id. at *145-46.
433. See id. at *6.
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goods for unpaid rent.434 Once the landlord seized the goods, they
were in his possession, but were considered in custodia legis
because the landlord had to stand ready to return the goods to the
tenant once the tenant paid the rent that was owed.4 35 Because the
goods were in custodia legis, as well as in the landlord's possession,
the wronged tenant could not use self-help to retake the goods, but
must resort to a legal procedure, replevin.436
These features of replevin make it perfect for Sophia's pur-
poses: women have been wrongfully dispossessed of their rights to
enjoy the fruits of Reason; the dispossessors, men, acted not
through a legal procedure, but solely through self-help. Therefore,
at any time during men's unlawful possession of these rights, they
can be called upon to return them. Interestingly, again, Sophia
equates men's wrongful seizure of women's original rights with
oppression, with means not legally sanctioned, and with Custom,
while arguing that women's rights will be vindicated through their
resort to legal institutions via the action of replevin. Moreover, the
concept that women's original rights, while wrongfully dispossessed
by men, have been in custodia legis implicitly associates the
protection of law with the realm of Reason.
Sophia's explicit invocation of Reason in this passage modu-
lates from Reason as the judge in a trial of human institutions to
Reason as the judging faculty in each individual. In her depiction
of Reason as judge, Sophia asserts Reason's "absolutely unlimited
... jurisdiction" over all people.437 The concept of 'jurisdiction" is
a subtle one; it implies both power on the part of the court to compel
a person to subject himself to its decrees, as well as the court's duty
to hear the claims of that person. In other words, just as a person
within a court's jurisdiction must respond when summoned, so
must a court respond when presented with a controversy within its
jurisdiction. Thus, in Sophia's metaphor, all persons are subject to
the demands and dictates of Reason; but at the same time, all
persons have the right to appeal to Reason to adjudicate their
claims. Figuring Reason as a judge, Sophia continues her earlier
identification of "rectified reason" as the judge of her cause.
Furthermore, the concept of "absolutely unlimited" jurisdiction
intensifies the exaltation of Reason, for all man-made courts have
only limited jurisdiction.
434. See id.
435. See id. at *146; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56, at 576.
436. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *146-47; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 56,
at 576-77. In this paragraph I am indebted to comments from Michael H. Hofflheirner.
437. See BEAUTY'S TRIUMPH, supra note 367, at 270.
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The unlimited jurisdiction of Reason, which makes it absolutely
open to the claims of all, also helps Sophia explain how women's
recovery of their rightful property will not oust men of theirs. What
women seek, the fruits of Reason ("[k]nowledge and truth") and the
means of attaining them, are not limited commodities. Women's
repossession of these goods will not require men's dispossession.
"Good sense" and "all that is intelligible" are, like Reason's jurisdic-
tion itself, unlimited in supply. If, because of their present state of
ineducation, some women and even some men (implicied by her use
of the gender-neutral pronoun "some") do not have the same
"facility" in using these qualities as do others, that inability does
not diminish their possessory right.
Even in the face of claims that Astell had no successors later in
the eighteenth century, we see here in the second quarter of the
century a very powerful argument embodying virtually all of
Astell's fundamental premises and even going beyond Astell in
rhetorical sophistication.4"' Whether Sophia knew the works of
Mary Astell or not, she framed her argument in the same terms,
pitting the liberating force of Reason against the repressive tyranny
of Custom.
From John Locke to Mary Wortley Montagu to Sophia, Custom
and Reason meant the same things that they meant to Mary Astell.
Custom was the force of tradition, of social construction, of the
already-established; Reason represented the force of original
natural rights, of liberatory potential. In the terms of satire,
discussed earlier, Custom represented what was; Reason repre-
sented what should be. The negative qualities with which women
were charged were attributed to Custom. Their potential for
improvement, especially intellectual improvement, was linked to
their capacity for Reason. This dichotomy and the ways in which
feminists had used it were well established within eighteenth-
century culture by the time Lennox composed The Female Quixote.
438. I disagree with Alice Browne, who describes the Sophia pamphlets in the following
way:
An English trilogy, by a writer using the pseudonym Sophia, uses Poulain's
structure and some of his material, but negates its seriousness by lightening
the tone, concentrating on character sketches of male and female fools, and
concluding with a traditional praise of women's superiority because of their
beauty and wit.
BROWNE, supra note 391, at 123. True, in the third part of the trilogy, Sophia unfortunately
accepts her opponent's terms of battle, presenting character sketches of learned and virtuous
women to counter his satirical portraits. The first part of the trilogy is not marred by this
method, however, and the strength and subtlety of Sophia's legal metaphors alone (the only
part of her work I examine in detail here) qualify Beauty's Triumph as the most important
mid-eighteenth-century feminist work in English.
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Any invocation of the terms within the novel would necessarily have
been understood by her and her readers within the context of this
preexisting discourse. Arabella's allegiance to Custom, in the form
of the romances, is satirized; as an adherent of Custom, she
partakes of the limitations imposed on eighteenth-century women.
Arabella's access to Reason, demonstrated by her reasoning powers
and her ability to engage in serious discourse, is celebrated; she
represents the potential of all women, once they are freed from
debilitating Custom. The feminist discourse of the Reason vs.
Custom dichotomy provided Lennox with a representation of
Woman as both "enlighten'd and ridiculous," a representation that
could bear the quixotean burden of simultaneous celebration and
ridicule.
C. The Female Quixote as the Woman of Reason
In her portrayal of Arabella, Lennox engages the same issues
that preoccupied the early eighteenth-century feminists: the
equality of male and female intellect, the necessity of a proper
education for women, and the tyranny of Custom. Lennox takes
pains to establish Arabella's mental as well as physical beauty. The
Marquis takes charge of her education in order to "render her Mind
as beautiful as her Person was lovely." '439 Arabella is continually
praised for her "fine Sense""' and the "Strength of her Understand-
ing";441 in Glanville's opinion, she has "more Wit than her whole Sex
besides." '442 Throughout the novel, running as a strong counter-
current against Arabella's romantic misinterpretations, is her
participation in the feminists' favorite pastime, "rational conversa-
tion." '443 Her conversation, on subjects other than the romances, is
"fine, easy, and entertaining";444 Miss Groves finds her "refined"
discourse "tedious," since it is "neither upon Fashions, Assemblies,
Cards, or Scandal." '445 At the dinner party with Sir George
Bellmour, Arabella "mixe[s] in the Conversation with that Wit and
Vivacity which was natural to her." '446 Sir Charles opines that she
"sometimes talk'd as learnedly as a Divine."4 7
439. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 6.
440. Id. at 61, 64.
441. Id. at 116.
442. Id. at 41.
443. MYERS, supra note 374, at 8, 80.
444. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 65.
445. Id. at 68.
446. Id. at 204.
447. Id. at 314.
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Although we are told that "her whole Time [had] been taken up
by [the] Study" of romances,448 the narrative repeatedly suggests
that she also found more substantial material in her father's
library.449 Even before her conversion, Arabella is depicted as a
suitable conversational companion to Glanville. At one point,
discussing the upcoming races with Charlotte, Arabella refers to
Alcibiades' triumphs at the Olympic games, prompting Glanville to
intervene and "turn[]" the conversation to "the Grecian History."45
While Charlotte "hum[s] a Tune, and tinkl[es] her Cousin's
Harpsichord," Arabella and Glanville engage for two hours in "the
more rational Entertainment" of conversation.45' All the evidence
in this passage - the fact that Glanville changes the subject from
a romantic to a historical one, the fact that the conversation is
described as "rational" and is "unintelligible" '452 to Charlotte, and
the duration of the conversation, with no hint of impatience or
exasperation on Glanville's part - indicates that Arabella can
converse engagingly on serious topics. Although this particular
conversation is not quoted, we do read two of Arabella's Johnsonian
disquisitions: her condemnation of raillery453 - which prompts Sir
Charles to tell her, "[Y]ou speak like an Orator""4 4 - and her
declamation on Indifference.455 Arabella's conversational powers
represent the tantalizing potential of women's rationality and the
benefits to men, in terms of intellectual companionship, that would
follow from educating women properly.
Arabella also represents the deleterious effects of an adherence
to Custom, the great enemy of society's recognition of women's
rational equality. Arabella is ruled by Custom. She recognizes the
"Authority of Custom";456 she honors the "Custom" of the maid's
relating the heroine's history;45 and she wonders why her suitor
does not follow the "Custom" of leaving a letter on her table before
his departure.458 Arabella wears a veil at Bath because that is "the
Custom of the Ladies in Clelia, and the Grand Cyrus."4"9 Her
inappropriate request to the Countess "to favour her with the
448. Id. at 7.
449. See id.
450. Id. at 83.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. See id. at 267-69.
454. Id. at 269.
455. See id. at 311.
456. Id. at 44.
457. Id. at 69.
458. See id. at 118.
459. Id. at 263.
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Recital of her Adventures" is "grounded upon the Customs of
antient Times."46 Custom both dictates and constrains Arabella's
actions, and since the Custom she relies upon derives from the
romances, her resulting actions are outlandish.
By making Arabella a slave to Custom, Lennox makes not just
a procedural point about the precedential mode of reasoning but
also a substantive point about the source of women's legal subordi-
nation. Eighteenth-century legal writers asserted that English
common law was, simply, Custom.461 Sir Robert Chambers, who
was assisted by Johnson in writing A Course of Lectures on the
English Law, states, 'The common law, in its strict acceptation,
consists of customs derived from immemorial tradition, and of
maxims established by immemorial practice." '462 In the Commentar-
ies, Blackstone first divides English law into "lex non scripta, the
unwritten, or common law" and the "lex scripta, the written, or
statute law."46 The lex non scripta "includes not only general
customs, or the common law properly so called; but also the
particular customs of certain parts of the kingdom." '464 Like the
"antient" customs of Arabella's romances, only customs that had
"been used time out of mind" could constitute the common law.46
Customs were given "weight and authority" only by the inability of
living persons to remember when they were not observed, or when,
in Blackstone's phrase, "the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary." '466
The recognition of a custom as part of English common law was
accomplished when a judge declared what the common law was.467
Still, Blackstone insisted, these judicial decisions were not the law
itself, but only evidence of the common law. 468  Despite this
insistence, however, Blackstone also advocated the doctrine of stare
decisis:
[I]t is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where
the same points come again in litigation; as well to keep the
scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with
460. Id. at 327.
461. See infra text accompanying notes 463-65.
462. 1 CHAMBERS, supra note 65, at 116.
463. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *63.
464. Id.
465. Id. at *67.
466. Id.
467. See DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 44-45 (1989).
468. See id. at 44-45, 85-86; see also Whitman, supra note 366, at 1360-61 (describing
common law as merely a product of custom).
1997]
80 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
every new judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case
being solemnly declared and determined, what before was
uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent
rule . 469
Change was what the early eighteenth-century feminists advocated,
and change was what the "permanent rules" resulting from reliance
on "former precedents" prevented. As one legal historian notes,
[F]rom the end of the thirteenth century to the beginning of the
nineteenth, legislation played a tiny part in the development of
private law. Nearly all of it was done in the courts; and judges
do not, as does Parliament, make avowed changes in the law in
response to argument about social needs. They do not make
avowed changes at all; and that is the point. 470
The static nature of the common law allowed the past to rule the
present, just as Arabella's romances ruled her life. As Mary Astell
exclaimed, "Men are possessed of all Places of Power, Trust and
Profit, they make Laws and exercise the Magistracy .... Immemo-
rial Prescription is on their Side in these Parts of the World, antient
Tradition and modern Usage!"47 ' The same criticism could be made
of the common law's reliance on precedent as Glanville makes of
Arabella's reliance on romances: "[D]o not suffer yourself to be
governed by such antiquated Maxims! The World is quite different
to what it was in those Days ... .""' The continued tyranny of
Custom over women's legal existence was ensured because English
common law was self-replicating and based upon Custom.
In view of the common law's hostility to "avowed changes,"
Custom was a conservative, backward-looking force. If Lennox's
novel were merely an apologia for the established patriarchal order,
we would expect Arabella's allegiance to this force to be lauded, but
clearly it is not. Her adherence to Custom is part of the "ridiculous"
aspect of her character. As we have seen, the novel presents
Arabella's reasoning powers as the "enlighten'd" part of her
character. But, in one of the novel's marvelous subtleties, the
disruptive potential of female Reason is fully acknowledged. As
Blackstone points out, the chain of common-law precedent can be
broken if a prior ruling is determined to be "contrary to reason." '473
469. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *69.
470. S.F.C. Milsom, Reason in the Development of the Common Law, 81 LAW Q. REV. 496,
497 (1965).
471. ASTELL, supra note 350, at 123.
472. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 45.
473. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *69.
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Reason can thus trump Custom and disrupt the stability of settled
precedent. In the domain of eighteenth-century law, power was
exercised only by men. Therefore, the disruptive potential of
Reason was contained within the homogenous group who instituted,
maintained, and benefitted from Custom. The situation would be
much different, however, if women were allowed to exercise Reason.
The early eighteenth-century feminists clearly saw that men
would feel threatened by women's effort "to break the enchanted
Circle that custom has plac'd us in." '474 Astell mused, "I know not
how the Men will resent it to have their enclosure broke down, and
Women invited to taste of that Tree of knowledge they have so long
unjustly Monopoliz'd. '475 In 'The Emulation," Egerton is more
certain about both the threat and men's reaction to it:
They're Wise to keep us Slaves, for well they know,
If we were loose, we soon should make them, so. 476
Clearly, in her eagerness to enact her romantic interpretations,
Arabella is a threatening figure. Glanville recognizes early on that
"his Happiness depended upon curing her of her romantic
Notions, 477 and as the novel continues, he grows increasingly
exasperated with her, at Vauxhall becoming "mad with Vexation. 478
Although Glanville's sentiments are attributed to embarrassment
at others' reactions to Arabella,479 the vehemence of his emotions
suggests that she poses a greater threat than just embarrassment.
Katherine Sobba Green characterizes The Female Quixote as a
"courtship novel," which she defines as "centering its story in the
brief period of autonomy between a young woman's coming out and
her marriage.' 4 0 But The Female Quixote actually engages
Arabella's story prior to her coming out in Bath and London, and
although Arabella exercises epistemological autonomy, she has in
fact no legal autonomy at all. Throughout the novel, she is a minor,
under her father's guardianship until his death, when she becomes
her uncle's ward.48 ' Arabella does not pose the same sort of threat
to the established order as does Clarissa Harlowe. Both women
474. ASTELL, supra note 345, at 3.
475. Id. at 20.
476. Egerton, supra note 357, lines 13-14.
477. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 117.
478. Id. at 336.
479. See, e.g., id. at 303, 336.
480. KATHERINE SOBBA GREEN, THE COURTSHIP NOVEL 1740-1820: A FEMINIZED GENRE
2-3 (1991).
481. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 59-65.
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benefit from their male progenitors' wills,482 and both women are
minors and thus cannot dispose of their property.48 Yet, unlike the
threat posed by Clarissa's accession to wealth, the threat Arabella
poses seems to derive less from what she has than from what she
is.
Lennox repeatedly emphasizes Arabella's "Singularity," the
"Singularity of her Dress,"'484 the "Singularity of her Manners, ' 485
and the "Singularity of her Notions." '486 Johnson's final definition
of "singularity" is "[c]haracter or manners different from those of
others";487 the corresponding definition of the adjective "singular" is
"[h]aving something not common to others. It is commonly used in
a sense of disapprobation, whether applied to persons or things.4 8
It is surely in the disapprobatory sense that Paulson characterizes
Arabella as a "monster of ... self-sufficiency. '489 Because she does
not share the common view of reality, because she employs her own
"frame of reference,' 490 Arabella is both singular and self-sufficient.
Her view of the world, while flawed, is authentic, based on her best
assessment of her situation. The authenticity, the sincerity, the
very transparency of Arabella's interpretations contribute to the
sympathy with which she is portrayed. As Deborah Ross points out,
"[a]ny romance heroine has power simply by virtue of her role ......
and "the reader cannot avoid feeling that Arabella, who is supposed
to be wrong, is actually right, because this is her story. 491 But
Arabella's power derives not merely from her status as heroine;
instead, she embodies the paradox of undernourished Reason.
Although the substance of her views is wrong, the quality that
inheres in her ownership of those views - her interpretive
autonomy - is presented as valuable.
Ultimately, however, the threatening aspect of her mental
powers becomes dominant and must be subdued. The individualis-
tic light in which Arabella sees things simply cannot be tolerated.
Arabella's interpretations place "common Occurrences... in a new
482. See id. at 64; RICHARDSON, supra note 117, at 53-54.
483. See LENNOX, supra note 200, at 64-65; JOHN P. ZOMCHICK, FAMILY AND THE LAW IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FICTION: THE PUBLIC CONSCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 64-66
(1993).
484. See LENNOX, supra note 200, at 8, 263, 334.
485. Id. at 197.
486. Id. at 323.
487. JOHNSON, supra note 116.
488. Id.
489. PAULSON, supra note 201, at 276.
490. Sloman, supra note 204, at 99.
491. Ross, supra note 213, at 461.
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Light."'492 Although this new light may be beneficent, as it is when
Arabella views Miss Groves in a "favourable Light,"'493 the new light
must be extinguished because it is not sanctioned by the commu-
nity. Arabella attempts to do what Lorraine Code says is impossi-
ble even for modern women: to "act according to her own lights,
with the full authority of a competent knower, in the expectation of
public acknowledgment." '494
Arabella's monstrous singularity, the new light that she sheds
on her world, is merely symptomatic of the power of the new
Cartesian "subjectivity - the capacity of the knower to bestow false
inner projections on the outer world of things." '495 The danger of
individual misinterpretation of reality is endemic to the Cartesian
model of knowledge. If, as Locke claimed, each person gains his or
her knowledge solely from his or her own "Sensation" and "Reflec-
tion, ' then what is to prevent each person from slipping into
complete solipsism? What is to hold the community of knowers
together? Locke gave a commonsense answer: "Experience and
Observation." '497 The usefulness of experience as a touchstone for
communal truth, however, depends on the shared nature of
experience, and Locke assumes that all knowers will share a
homogenous experience."' As The Female Quixote demonstrates,
however, human experience is not homogenous; Arabella acts
perfectly reasonably given her experience. The failure of experience
in Arabella's case challenges Cartesian faith in the possibility of
shared knowledge.
In fact, Arabella exposes an important fissure in Cartesian
epistemology: its gender assumptions. As Code notes, in the classic
epistemelogical formula, "S knows that P," the sex of the knower
has not been addressed by traditional philosophers, at least in part
because an admission that the sex of the knower might matter
would challenge the Cartesian assumption that "all knowers are...
alike with respect both to their cognitive capacities and to their
methods of achieving knowledge." '499 Also, Code points out, if the
sex of the knower affects the quality of the knowledge, then that
knowledge cannot be "objective" and, therefore, is deemed less valu-
492. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 65.
493. Id. at 77.
494. CODE, supra note 2, at 188.
495. SUSAN BORDO, THE FLIGHT TO OBJEcTIVITY: ESSAYS ON CARTESIANISM AND CULTURE
51 (1987).
496. LOCKE, supra note 279, bk. II, ch. 1, §§ 3, 4, at 105.
497. Id. at bk. I, ch. 4, § 25, at 102, 103, passim.
498. See, e.g., id. at bk. I, ch. 4, § 12, at 91; id. bk. II, ch. 1, § 9, at 108-09.
499. CODE, supra note 2, at 6.
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able.5" Despite this reluctance to address explicitly the sex of the
knower, Code argues, "it has long been tacitly assumed that S is
male."' ' Concomitantly, traditional epistemology has consigned
women to the subordinate axis of the Objective/Subjective dichot-
omy:
[W]omen are often (albeit perhaps unthinkingly) consigned to
an insignificant place in a community of knowers on the basis
of claims that their 'knowledge' is hopelessly subjective. Such
claims are commonly based on women's purported incapacity to
rise above the practical, sensuous, and emotional preoccupa-
tions of everyday life. Hence women are judged unfit for the ab-
stract life of pure reason in which true knowers must engage.0 2
As long as only objective knowledge is highly valued and as long as
women's claims to knowledge are perceived as subjective, women's
"deliberative faculty" will be "without authority."5 °
Arabella illustrates this point precisely. Her experience fails
to regulate her interpretations because it is substantively different
from the male experience posited as normative. Her inadequate
education, coupled with her reasoning powers, makes her the
epitome of subjectivity: her view of the world is shared by no one
else. Arabella represents the shadow lurking behind the Cartesian
image of the mind. Once granted equal powers of Reason, women
would also exercise subjectivity, the power of interpreting their
world. And because they did not share the normative male
experience, their knowledge was dangerous to the community and
was, concomitantly, devalued. Thus, the early eighteenth-century
feminists linked their claims to Reason with pleas for better
education for women. A better education, one based on the classics,
not on plays and romances, would restrain women's subjectivity,
would allow them to partake of male experience, and would enable
them to join the community of authoritative knowers.
500. See id. at 6-7.
501. Id. at 8.
502. Id. at 28-29.
503. Id. at 9 (quoting ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1260





Sir Charles... express'd much Admiration of her Wit, telling
her, if she had been a Man, she would have made a great Figure
in Parliament, and that her Speeches might have come perhaps
to be printed in time.5 4
Sir Charles' compliment to Arabella, made after her declama-
tion on Indifference, assumes the separation of mind and body that
underlay the eighteenth-century feminists' arguments. Arabella's
"Wit," her mind, qualifies her for public service; it is only her body,
her femaleness, that disqualifies her. To "ma[k]e a great Figure in
Parliament," Sir Charles realizes, it is necessary to have a male
body. The use of the conditional ("if... she would have") marks his
recognition of the contrary-to-fact nature of his suggestion. No
matter how admirable her intellect, Arabella cannot change the sex
of her body. Her femaleness ensures that her speeches, the
products of her mind, will remain ephemeral and will not be
preserved for posterity.
Sir Charles' invocation of the mindlbody dichotomy echoes
earlier references in the novel. We have already seen that the
Marquis recognizes the dichotomy: by educating her, he hopes to
"render her Mind as beautiful as her Person was lovely."' ' 5 Later,
Selvin tells her, "[Y]ou as much excel [Princess Julia] in the
Beauties of your Person, as you do in the Qualities of your Mind. 50 6
However, Sir Charles' remark does much more than assert that
Arabella's strong intellect is uncontaminated by her womanly body;
it imagines a woman as citizen, a role denied her in eighteenth-
century England. As Linda Colley puts it, "[A] woman could not by
definition be a citizen and could never look to possess political
rights. 50 7 As we have already seen, suffrage and the right to serve
on juries were linked. Arabella, as imagined by Sir Charles here,
would no longer be limited to service on the jury of matrons. If Sir
Charles can envision Arabella as a Member of Parliament, then he
can also envision her voting in Parliamentary elections and, by
implication, serving on the jury. But are we, as readers, supposed
to take Sir Charles seriously here?
504. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 311.
505. Id. at 6.
506. Id. at 272.
507. COLLEY, supra note 54, at 238.
1997]
86 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
Helen Thomson calls Sir Charles' exclamation "one of Charlotte
Lennox's metafictional jokes."5 °8 Another critic, Jocelyn Coates,
describes Sir Charles' comment as "unusually strong praise for a
woman in the eighteenth century.... [H]ere Arabella is the equal
intellectually of men and is held back only by circumstance, not a
lack of talent."50 9 Everything in the novel supports the view that
Arabella's intellectual equality is praiseworthy, and certainly, the
vision of Arabella as a Member of Parliament sounds like praise to
modern women. However, the issue of public roles for women was
controversial for eighteenth-century feminists. We have already
seen that Mary Astell eschewed advocacy of public roles for women,
while the more radical Sophia argued that women were capable of
filling such roles.
The fact that it is Sir Charles who notes Arabella's political
potential is significant because he is portrayed almost as a buffoon
- certainly, as the least perceptive character in the novel.
Congruent with the character of the speaker here, it seems likely
that in the mid-eighteenth century, the suggestion that a woman
might be qualified to serve in Parliament would not have been
viewed seriously. The vicious lampooning of the Duchess of
Devonshire for publicly campaigning for Charles James Fox in the
Parliamentary election of 1784 illustrates the prevailing hostility
to women's participation in the political process. 10 Even the
Duchess of Devonshire, with all her financial and social resources,
failed to surmount her status as a noncitizen: her "champions were
unable to construct a satisfying way of legitimising and explaining
her endeavours."51 Even a century later, in 1867, pamphleteers
were still urging extension of the Parliamentary franchise (not the
right to actually serve in Parliament) to women. 12
508. Helen Thomson, Charlotte Lennox's The Female Quixote: A Novel Interrogation, in
LIVING BY THE PEN: EARLY BRITISH WOMEN WRITERS 113, 125 (Dale Spender ed., 1992).
509. Jocelyn Martha Coates, The "Intellectual Entertainments" of Charlotte Lennox:
Literary Strategies of an Eighteenth Century Professional Woman Writer 182 (1992)
(dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
510. See COLLEY, supra note 54, at 242-48.
511. Id. at 246.
512. See T. CHISHOLM ANSTEY, ESQ., ON SOME SUPPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS
UPON THE PARLIAMENTARY FRANCHISE 10 (London 1867) ("It was a favourite argument with
Lord Coke and his school, that those who could not sit in Parliament, had therefore no voice
in elections to Parliament. The fallacy has long been exploded.'); HELEN TAYLOR, THE CLAIM
OF ENGLISHWOMEN TO THE SUFFRAGE CONSTITUTIONALLY CONSIDERED 9 (London 1867)
"For who else among us, entitled by law to hold property to a certain amount,
is nevertheless deprived of the vote which the British Constitution looks upon
as the safeguard of property? The answer will be - Minors, idiots, lunatics,
and criminals. These, and these only, are classed politically along with women.
But none of these are so classed in anything but in politics."
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Nevertheless, Sir Charles' exclamation should also be read in
light of the way in which the enlightened aspect of Arabella's
intellect prefigures the intellectual potential of all women. Just as
the novel implicitly critiques the limitation of women's participation
in the interpretive community of the jury, so perhaps Sir Charles
explicitly reminds us of another public arena that was closed even
to intellectual women. His association of service in Parliament with
Arabella's intellectual capacity, and his almost wistful recognition
that her Johnsonian discourse will not survive, suggest that the
vision of Arabella as a Member of Parliament has a more serious
connotation, not just to modern readers, but within the context of
contemporary feminist discourse. To see the still-romantic Arabella
as a public officer may have been clownish, like Sir Charles himself,
Id. Helen Taylor's tract, especially, exposes the triumph of complementarity. She asks:
Whence, then, comes this exception? Why, when they possess the necessary
property, are women, alone among citizens of full age and sane mind,
unconvicted of crime, disabled by a merely personal circumstance (that of sex)
from exercising a right attached by our institutions to property and not to
persons?
Id. at 10. She goes on to give an historical answer: "(D]uring the earlier period of our
constitutional history, society was in so unsettled a state that women could not practically
administer their own property, which led to women's not being included among the voters
in the elections of members of Parliament." Id. Taylor pursues the incongruity of allowing
women property ownership without permitting them the vote:
Many centuries elapsed after our electoral system had been brought into
tolerably regular operation, before the progress of law and order enabled
women, as a matter of course, to exercise openly the civil rights which the law
attaches to property. It is in the natural course of things that now, after one or
two centuries of the practical enjoyment of their civil rights, intelligent women
begin to ask why the political rights should not accompany them.
. . .The English representative system, such as it is, good or bad,
represents not persons but property. By holding property women take on
the rights and duties of property. If they are not interested in politics,
their property is.
Id. at 11-12. Taylor then addresses the primary objection of her audience, "the theory that
'all women are destined for family life."' Id. at 13.
Whether or not all women are destined for family life, all Englishwomen do not
live it; whether or not women are fitted by nature to be anything else than
wives and mothers, many Englishwomen are something else; whether law
ought or ought not to recognise women as anything else, the law of England
does so recognise them. Marriage may or may not be the only good, the only
ideal existence for all women; but the law of England has long ago refused to
drive women into marriage, as sheep are driven into a fold, by shutting every
gate against them but the one they are intended to go through.
Id. at 14.
Taylor's emphasis on Englishwomen's right to exercise the civil and political rights
dependent on property would, of course, apply equally to jury service. And her refutation of
her audience's anticipated objections to the extension of the franchise demonstrate that by
the mid-nineteenth century, the "inferior intellect" theory had been abandoned in favor of
the "separate spheres" theory.
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in light of eighteenth-century reality, but to imagine a woman as a
"Figure" in Parliament, with all the sexual resonance of that term,
was merely a logical extension of the eighteenth-century feminists'
vision of women's mental potential. True, women could not serve
in Parliament until their femaleness no longer mattered; many
social and legal changes would have to occur before a woman like
Arabella could serve her country in a public role. But, just as the
intrusion of the pregnant female body into the English courtroom
created a fissure in monolithic male authority, so this image of
Arabella as a Member of Parliament intrudes into the patriarchal
discourse of the novel and forces the most patriarchal of characters
to acknowledge the possibility of a public arena for women's power.
In the end, of course, Arabella neither becomes a Member of
Parliament nor embarks upon a career. Instead, she merely enters
into a companionate marriage, an ending which, as we have seen,
draws criticism from modern feminist critics. But as Joan Kelly
points out, even those like Astell whom we now classify as "femi-
nists" would not have called themselves that. "If they had applied
any name to themselves, it would have been something like
defenders or advocates of women." '513 In the eighteenth century, the
debate centered on the intellectual status of women: were they
mentally inferior to men? To be a feminist in eighteenth-century
England meant answering this question in the negative. Moreover,
to be a feminist meant having "a sure sense that the sexes are
culturally, and not just biologically, formed." '514 Thus, in answer to
the question, "Why are there so few women who have demonstrated
their intellectual equality?" eighteenth-century feminists answered,
"Because Custom, created and maintained by men, has denied
women an equal education and equal opportunity to exercise their
mental powers." In response to the final question posed to women's
advocates in the eighteenth century, "In what roles do women want
to exercise their intellectual powers?" moderates like Astell gave a
conservative (by modern standards) answer: as wives and mothers.
Only radicals like Sophia dared to suggest a public role for women.
In The Female Quixote, by drawing upon the vocabulary of
Custom and Reason, by celebrating Arabella's intellectual powers,
by showing that her "Follies" result from her inadequate education
(which eighteenth-century feminists regularly equated with. the
reading of romances), and by suggesting, ever so ambiguously, that
513. Joan Kelly, Early Feminist Theory and the Querelle des Femmes, 1400-1789, 8 SIGNS:
J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 4, 5 n.3 (1982).
514. Id. at 7.
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women might be qualified for public roles, Lennox makes the same
claims for Arabella that the eighteenth-century feminists made for
all women. Arabella's marriage to Glanville, their union in "every
Virtue and laudable Affection of the Mind,515 represents one
version of a feminist future for a mid-eighteenth-century woman.
B.
The two correlative propositions advocated by the eighteenth-
century feminists - that women's minds are distinct from their
bodies and that women's intellects are equal to men's - challenged
on the most fundamental level the relegation of women to the jury
of matrons. Had the feminists of the eighteenth century succeeded
in championing these propositions, the conceptual foundation of the
jury of matrons would have been exploded. Women's power of
judging no longer would have been seen as inferior to men's and no
longer would have been limited by the conceptual link between
bodily difference and intellectual weakness.
As Erica Harth notes, however, the separation of mind from
body led to a "discursive trap": "If an identical disembodied mind
in men and women alike is made to be the principle of sexual
equality, what can be made of embodied difference?""51 Ultimately,
as Londa Schiebinger demonstrates, this trap was avoided by
reinstating a link between mind and body. The principle of
"complementarity" accounted for the biological differences in the
male and female bodies by positing distinctions in kind between
their intellectual and emotional faculties, distinctions that corre-
sponded to the differing activities assigned to the public and private
spheres. 17 That is, women's mental abilities, while not inferior to
men's under the complementarity theory, fitted them distinctively
and solely for the domestic sphere. As earlier critics have ably
shown, it was this theory of complementarity that justified women's
continued exclusion from the jury. The eventual triumph of
complementarity in the nineteenth century proved that the early
eighteenth-century feminists had been right: Society's view of
women's minds vis-a-vis their bodies was crucial for women's
education and, in turn, for their social, political, and legal rights.
515. LENNOX, supra note 200, at 383 (emphasis added).
516. HARTH, supra note 334, at 9.
517. See SCHIEBINGER, supra note 16, at 214-44.
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